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Due to the rapid development and technological complexity of
computer software, courts and legislatures have experienced
great dfflculty in adapting the law so as to provide adequate
proprietaryprotection for such products. In this article, the au-
thor discusses the physical and legal safeguards available to
software manufacturers and the remedies they may obtain when
these safeguards fail
I. THE NEED FOR PROPRIETARY PROTECTION
Since the initial development in 1953 of computer software for
commercial use,' the software industry has burgeoned. The dollar
value of transactions in computer software has now surpassed that of
hardware sales, and software is at the same time drawing the most re-
search attention. The number of hardware manufacturers remains rel-
atively few, but software companies continue to spring up rapidly.
This commercial scene exists even though entry and continued success
in the software field require great and continuously developing exper-
tise, large amounts of capital are necessary for research and develop-
ment, and skilled programmers and software developers are in short
supply.
These circumstances, together with the ever-increasing demand for
computer products and the relatively low cost of copying software, set
the stage for the industry's present concern about ways of safeguarding
against misappropriation of its products. If software producers are to
have the incentive to continue exerting their efforts in much needed
software development and to realize the return on their financial in-
vestments necessary to attract investment capital, they require assur-
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1. See Scafetta, Computer Software Protection: The Copyright Revision Bills and41-
ternaives, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 381 (1975).
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ance, in the form of legal protection, that the industry will be free from
unfair competition by both established and aspiring competitors. Thus,
the growth of the computer industry brings with it not only special legal
problems stemming from procurement, such as the scope and effect of
warranties and disclaimers,2 but also the need for novel application of
established doctrines and development of new laws for the proprietary
protection of software manufacturers. This protection will need to ex-
tend to both computer programs (operating instructions for computer
systems) and data bases (compilations of reference and other kinds of
information stored in computers). Furthermore, if access of competi-
tors is to be cut off, manufacturers must be able to protect themselves
not only from unauthorized appropriation by rivals, but by visitors,
customers and employees as well.
Manufacturers have already taken steps to prevent misappropria-
tion of their products. Computer plants carefully screen their visitors
and forbid them access to areas where manufacturing secrets are stored,
restrict access to data bases by the use of passwords that enable only
licensees to retrieve information, and intentionally feed erroneous or
nonsensical information into storage so that misappropriated data com-
pilations can be readily detected. Plant employees are carefully
screened before hiring, and many of them are restrained from entering
plant areas not vital to the performance of their tasks and apt to con-
tain industrial secrets. Employees may also be periodically required to
produce inventory accounts so that they will be less tempted to siphon
off software. Furthermore, various company properties remain locked
in confidential files. Moreover, it is recommended that employees be
well-paid to avoid their being easily tempted by the offers of competi-
tors, willing to pay attractive sums for access to know-how.3
Since customers, too, may leak secrets to which they have become
privy, manufacturers must take special action to protect against their
disclosures. Such precautions may include leasing instead of selling
computer software so that manufacturers can continue to exercise some
control over the uses to which their products are put. As lessors, they
should put proprietary notices on both programs and data displays so
that customers will be aware of the manufacturers' proprietary claims.
Whenever possible, lessors should furnish lessees object programs,
geared to the lessee's particular use, rather than source programs.
4
2. See Chandler, Computer Transactions- Potential Liability of Computer Users and
Vendors, 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 431-35.
3. Scafetta, Computer Software and Unfair Methods of Competition, 10 J. MAR. J.
PRAC. & PROC. 447, 463 (1977). For other safety measures, see Allen, Danger
Ahead! Safeguard Your Computer, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1968, at 97.
4. Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065, 7 Computer
L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1004, 1005-06 (N.D. I11. 1979), aft'd on other grounds,
628 F.2d 1038, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1438 (7th Cir. 1980).
Normally, a computer program consists of several phases which may be
summarized as follows. The first phase is the development of a flow
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Customers should be required to take affirmative steps to guard against
disclosure of proprietary information as they make rightful use of their
leased materials. Finally, manufacturers should require that both em-
ployees and customers expressly promise not to disclose processes or
know-how or to use these secrets for the purpose of competing.
When these precautions fail to prevent misappropriation, manu-
facturers require the aid of the courts in protecting their investments.
Both injunctive relief and monetary damages are recoverable under a
variety of legal theories, some statutory and others judicially fashioned
products of the common law. Plaintiffs may be protected by the sanc-
tion of criminal penalties or may obtain civil relief in federal court,
under the trademark, copyright, or patent laws, or in state court, based
on contract, quasi-contract, trade secret, misappropriation, or unfair
competition doctrines. This article discusses the availability, require-
ments, scope, and relative advantages of the protection these various
bodies of law offer to the proprietor of computer software.
II. PRE-EMPTION
It is important to note at the outset the effect that federal pre-emp-
tion may have on the availability of state protection and remedies. Pre-
emption occurs whenever Congress has so legislated in an area that the
effectiveness of its legislation and the purpose behind it would be frus-
trated by independent state attempts to regulate or afford remedies in
the same area.5 States are then precluded from applying the regula-
tions and remedies they have fashioned. Congress has afforded perva-
sive protections and remedies to authors, inventors and merchants
through enactment of the federal copyright, patent and trademark laws.
Consequently, states may not grant equivalent protection to subject
matter within the scope of these federal laws.6 Thus, for example, com-
mon law copyright, whereby an author acquired upon the creation of
chart which is a schematic representation of the program's logic. It sets
forth the logical steps involved in solving a given problem. The second
phase is the development of a "source program" which is a translation of
the flow chart into computer programming language, such as FOR-
TRAN or COBOL. Source programs may be punched on decks of cards
or imprinted on discs, tapes or drums. The third phase is the develop-
ment of an "assembly program" which is a translation of the program-
ming language into machine language, ie., mechanically readable
computer language. Unlike source programs, which are readable by
trained programmers, assembly programs are virtually unintelligible ex-
cept by the computer itself. Finally, the fourth phase is the development
of an "object program" which is a conversion of the machine language
into a device commanding a series of electrical impulses. Object pro-
grams, which enter into the mechanical process itself, cannot be read
without the aid of special equipment and cannot be understood by even
the most highly trained programmers.
Id
5. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176-77 (1942).
6. J. NOWACK, HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267 (1978); Nimtz, Develop-
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his work exclusive rights to copy it until it was published, has been
largely abolished by the federal copyright statute.
Nevertheless, other forms of non-federal proprietary protection re-
main available. The much-discussed case of Kewanee Oil v. Bicron
Corp. I is authority for the rule that a state may provide a remedy for
misappropriation of trade secrets even in cases in which the "secret"
process or technique so protected was appropriate for patent protection,
but no patent had been applied for.9 The United States Supreme Court
in Kewanee noted that both the encouragement of patent applications
and the granting of patent protection were necessary to foster full dis-
closure of new inventions and technologies and to avoid useless dupli-
cation of effort. 10 It was held, however, that states maintain an interest
in fostering commercial ethics and in encouraging the kinds of effort
and expenditure involved in inventions that do not rise to the level of
novelty and nonobviousness required for federal patent protection."
The Court was not persuaded by the argument that inventors would be
dissuaded from seeking federal patents because of the availability of
state remedies; 2 it believed that the greater benefits of the patent laws
(inter alia, exclusive rights to use or license the patented process, even
in the event of independent re-inventions) would provide inventors suf-
ficient incentive to seek patents.'
3
Relying on Kewanee, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, in Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., '4 afforded injunctive
relief against use of computer trade secrets.'- In that case, it was rea-
soned that both decency and the high cost incurred in protecting
against misappropriation warranted application of the state trade secret
laws.' 6 Accordingly, former employees of Analogic were enjoined
from using the specific know-how they had acquired to build a copy of
Analogic's high speed data acquisition module when they formed their
own competing business.7
ment of the Law of Computer Software, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) § 4-
1, art. 6, at 297, 313-14 (1980).
7. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5745; see 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. IV 1980).
8. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
9. Id at 491-92. Although state trade secret law is not pre-empted by federal patent
law, state unfair competition law may be pre-empted by federal design patent law.
See Compco Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
10. 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
11. Id at 481-84.
12. Id at 484-85.
13. Id at 489-91.
14. 371 Mass. 643, 358 N.E.2d 804, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 345 (1976).
15. Id at 646-47, 358 N.E.2d at 806-07, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 347.
16. Id at 646, 358 N.E.2d at 806, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 347.
17. Id at 647, 358 N.E.2d at 807, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 347-48.
The facts, as presented, were insufficient for the court to determine whether a
permanent injunction should be granted. Id at 647, 358 N.E.2d at 807, 6 Com-
puter L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 348-49.
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Additionally, federal proprietary laws do not preclude states from
enforcing contractual arrangements initiated by manufacturers to pro-
tect their non-patented inventions. For example, in Painton & Co. v.
Bourns Inc., i the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that pursuant to state law an exclusive licensing agreement,
which placed limitations on the licensee's use of certain engineering
and manufacturing techniques, could be enforced although no patent
application had been filed.' 9 Upon termination of the agreement, the
licensor, Bourns, was able to recover license payments due under the
contract.2° Bourns was also entitled to a trial to prove its allegation
that, based on the contract, the licensee, Painton, no longer had the
right to use the information supplied by Bourns-information Bourns
alleged to involve trade secrets.2 '
Non-federal remedies thus remain available to software manufac-
turers whose proprietary rights have been infringed. Still, it may be
difficult to determine whether, in a particular case, the state protection
sought is the equivalent of federal protection and is thus pre-empted.
22
For example, while it has been suggested that an action based on mis-
appropriation of a computer data base may be a proper subject for fed-
eral copyright law and, therefore, no longer possible under the common
law,23 it has also been held in a computer software case that an action
based on breach of trust or confidentiality is not pre-empted. 4
III. PROPRIETARY PROTECTION UNDER STATE LAW
.4. Criminal Sanctions
Although manufacturers may have recourse to state criminal law
sanctions to protect their computer property, access to such remedies
has not come without difficulty. The stumbling block has been that
computer property so valuable to manufacturers and their competitors
may not qualify as property under a state theft or larceny statute.25
Furthermore, the means employed to misappropriate such property
may not constitute the requisite "taking" or "carrying away."26 In such
18. 442 F.2d 216, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 558 (2d Cir. 1971).
19. Id at 223, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 571. Cf. Lear v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 653 (1969) (if a licensee is contesting the validity of a patent, the license
agreement will be enforced only if the validity of the patents is established).
20. 442 F.2d 216, 223, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 558, 571-72 (2d Cir.
1971).
21. Id at 233, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 584.
22. See, e.g., 8 COMPUTER L. & TAx REP., Dec. 1981, at 1, for a discussion of recent
cases on whether § 301 of the Copyright Act pre-empts state protection of a
software proprietor's trade secrets.
23. Bigelow, Copyright in Computerized Data Bases, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLA-
OHAN) § 4-3, art. 3, at 6 (1972).
24. Management Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Syss., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) 921 (N.D. IlM. 1978).
25. See Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 691-92, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977).
26. The essential elements of larceny normally include actual or constructive taking
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cases, criminal laws alone may provide no deterrent to the wrongful
appropriation of computer software.
A case that illustrates the potential difficulty a software proprietor
may encounter in seeking to have criminal laws applied is Hancock v.
State.27 In this Texas case, the defendant, a computer programmer,
was charged with the theft of fifty-nine "documents in writing," i.e.,
computer programs.2" He had allegedly photocopied them and offered
to sell them to his employer's competitor at a price of five million dol-
lars, but he had never removed the originals of the programs from his
employer's premises.29 In defense, Hancock argued that the computer
programs alleged to have been stolen did not constitute "corporeal per-
sonal property" and, therefore, could not be the subject of theft.3" The
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas applied the state penal code's defi-
nition of property, which included "all writings of every description,
provided such property possesses any ascertainable value."'" It was
concluded that computer programs fell within that definition.32 The
defendant's petition for habeas corpus relief, which averred that the
only property he took-the photocopying paper-was of insufficient
monetary value to justify his conviction for felony theft, was also
unsuccessful.
33
Although Texas criminal law was effective against Hancock, the
uncertainty surrounding the application of theft and larceny statutes is
made evident by that case. Many state theft statutes may not be as
flexible in providing protection against misappropriation of the ideas
contained in photocopies. It is conceivable that processes worth mil-
lions of dollars to their developers may occasion summary dismissals
when they are the subjects of larceny trials.
Computer industry representatives have sought enactment of state
criminal laws worded so broadly that they will be certain to attribute
guilt to those who take intangible property such as computer programs.
Furthermore, beginning in 1964, specific trade secret criminal statutes
have been enacted in twenty-one jurisdictions, including most of the
and carrying away the goods of another, without consent and with felonious in-
tent. Eg., People v. Goodchild, 68 Mich. App. 226, 242, 242 N.W.2d 465, 468
(1976).
27. 402 S.W.2d 906, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 562 (Tex. Crim. App.
1966).
28. Id at 907, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 563.
29. Id at 907, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 564-65.
30. Id at 908, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 565.
31. Id (quoting TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 1418 (Vernon 1925)). The definition of prop-
erty in the current version of the statute includes "a document... that represents
or embodies anything of value." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.01(6)(c)
(Vernon 1974).
32. 402 S.W.2d 906, 908, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 562, 565 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1966).
33. Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552, 553, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 858,
859 (5th Cir. 1967).
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leading industrial and technological states.3 4 In states without such
statutes, unless existing laws "can be interpreted to protect against mis-
appropriation of the trade secret itself, as opposed to the article embod-
ying it, appropriation of the former may not be criminal.
35
The particular utility of criminal trade secret misappropriation law
lies not only in the protection against theft of intangibles such as com-
puter programs, but also in the protection against the unique methods
of misappropriating computer property: reproducing by hand or pho-
tocopying; memorizing the software and then reproducing it away from
the employer's premises; or even making and carrying away printouts
of programs illegally retrieved from the computer's memory.36 For ex-
ample, in Ward v. Superior Court,3 7 a computer service bureau em-
ployee was found guilty under California's trade secret theft statute for
accessing. a competitor's computer system by telephone, retrieving a
program, printing it out at his own location, and then carrying the
printout to his own office.
Even where exercised, criminal penalties alone may not provide a
sufficient deterrent to software trade secret theft. The defendant in
Ward received three years probation and was fined only five thousand
dollars for stealing software valued at between ten and twenty-five
thousand dollars.38 However, his same deeds gave rise to a civil action
in which the plaintiff service bureau recovered over $300,000.3' There-
fore, it is not surprising that civil trade secret misappropriation actions
are viewed by some as the optimum form of proprietary protection for
computer software.
B. Civil Actions
Many software proprietors have obtained relief in civil actions,
based on a variety of legal theories. Plaintiffs have sought relief alleg-
34. Bender, Trade Secret Software Protection, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
§ 4-4, art. 2, at 16-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bender]. Bender also observed:
There are no express federal trade secrets misappropriation criminal
statutes, although there are statutes proscribing the transportation, or
sale and receipt of stolen goods, wares, merchandise, securities or
money. The principal element in determining whether these statutes
preclude misappropriation of a trade secret is the determination of
whether a trade secret falls within the statutory language.
Id at 20. In Europe, however, specific trade secret criminal statutes have long
been common. Id at 14.
35. Id at 16.
36. Id at 9-19. For more examples of trade secret protection available to computer
software, see id at 19-20. But see United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.
1966), in which the court indicated in dictum that memorizing a proprietor's trade
secret and copying it down in another state would not constitute interstate trans-
portation of stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
365 F.2d at 393.
37. 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972).




ing defendants' actions constituted unfair competition through use of
wrongfully acquired trade secrets, breach of an implied obligation not
to disclose or competitively use trade secrets to which the defendant
had rightful access, or breach of express contractual agreements not to
divulge confidential information or use it in proscribed ways. Success-
ful litigants have been those able to prove the existence of a trade se-
cret, its misappropriation and its use in competition. Those alleging
breach of contractual commitments have also had to show that the con-
tract provisions upon which they relied were not unenforceable.
Trade secrecy is a doctrine recognized in every American jurisdic-
tion.40 The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as "any formula,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who do not know or use it."' 4' This definition makes it clear
that a trade secret must be of competitive value. In fact, a litigant may
find that he can obtain no civil remedy for theft of a trade secret unless
the secret has been put to some competitive use. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has noted, the purpose of trade
secret law is to regulate unfair business competition, not to substitute
for the criminal laws against theft.42
Nevertheless, competitive use may be found even when the de-
fendant has not yet realized a profit from his misappropriation. In Uni-
versity Computing Co. v. Lykes- Youngstown Corp.,4 3 the defendants'
copying of plaintiff's automated inventory evaluation system consti-
tuted commercial and competitive use of the plaintiff's trade secrets be-
cause the defendants themselves had used the system and had
represented the system to potential buyers as their own. 4 The court
40. Id at 15-17.
41. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939), quotedin University Comput-
ing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 1248, 1258 (5th Cir. 1974). In Nimtz, Development ofthe Law of Com-
puter Software, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) § 4-1, art. 6, at 297 (1980),
the author notes that this definition of trade secrets clearly affords protection for
computer software. Id at 313. The first Restatement explained that, generally,
liability for use or disclosure of another's trade secrets arises where the
appropriator:
(a) ... discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) [acted in such a way that] disclosure or use constitutes a breach of
confidence reposed in him by [others] in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) . . .learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts
that it was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper
means or that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach
of his duty to the other, or
(d). . .learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and
that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
42. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 539, 5
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1248, 1265 (5th Cir. 1974).
43. 504 F.2d 518, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1248 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Id at 541, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1269.
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believed that the defendants' inability to market the system was insig-
nificant.45 Additionally, the court held that the misappropriator of a
trade secret need not be in present or potential competition with the
plaintiff. He may compete merely in the sense that he has removed
himself as a potential customer by putting the plaintiff's trade secret to
use, without license to do so.
46
The trade secret must not only have some impact on trade but, as
the name indicates, it must also be secret.47 It will remain the subject of
legal protection only so long as its secrecy is maintained. However,
trade secrets are not required to be so completely novel that no one else
has ever utilized them. They may be quite widely disseminated and,
yet, remain secrets if some effort has been made to limit their use and
disclosure.
In Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 48 the de-
signer of a minicomputer supplied customers with its design logic so
that they could perform their own maintenance.49 These widely dis-
tributed maintenance diagrams were accompanied, however, by propri-
etary legends and notices restricting use of the diagrams to
maintenance needs. Customers were required to enter into confidenti-
ality agreements. Consequently, when the defendants obtained the
maintenance diagram from an original equipment manufacturer and
used it to build a functionally equivalent computer, their defense that
the plaintiff-designer had not taken adequate precautions to protect its
trade secret failed.5" Even in the presence of widespread distribution,
the plaintiffs efforts to limit use and disclosure of its technical informa-
tion were sufficient to invoke the trade secret doctrine. 51
A software proprietor's internal precautions to guard his secret
may also be important. In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc.,52 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found the existence of a trade secret based upon evidence that docu-
ments relating to Sperry Rand's misappropriated magnetic memory
core manufacturing process had been stamped "Company Confiden-
tial," that the doors to offices where such documents were stored were
45. Id at 540, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1268.
46. Id
47. Id at 534, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1258. A protective order may
be granted in cases in which a proprietor desires to safeguard against any unnec-
essary disclosure of software development during the pendency of a court action.
Electronic Assistance Corp. v. New York, 362 F. Supp. 755, 758, 4 Computer L.
Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 945, 946-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. IBM, 60
F.R.D. 650, 652-53, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 486, 486-87 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220, 222, 4 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) 33, 35 (W.D. Va. 1972).
48. 357 A.2d 105, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1073 (Del. Ch. 1975).
49. Id at 108, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1077.
50. Id at 110-11, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1079-81.
51. Id at 110-11, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1080-81.
52. 311 F. Supp. 910, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 600 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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locked, and that visitors to the Sperry plant were carefully screened.5 3
In Telex Corp. v. IBM, 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found that trade secret protection remained available
even though IBM's object code was in daily, open, unrestricted use by
employees since its more readily copyable source code was kept se-
curely locked. Similarly, in Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex,
Inc.,55 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan was influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had built pass-
words into its system to prevent unauthorized access and had kept its
magnetic tapes and symbolics locked when not in use.56
In software cases, the courts may also be inclined to find the exist-
ence of trade secrets because of the general consensus among software
companies that their products are secret, confidential and proprietary
in nature. This belief is understandable, considering the large sums of
capital expended in developing such products. "A court may well be
persuaded by the amount of effort or money expended in developing
the information in question, and the resulting value of that informa-
tion."57 Economic considerations may, in fact, be more important than
secrecy or novelty in determining whether a trade secret exists 5 8
The protection afforded by trade secret law does not extend to
preventing use of the trade secret by non-licensees who have discovered
the secret independently or who have discerned it, through "reverse
engineering,"59 from the proprietor's marketed products.60 Thus, the
benefits of trade secret protection fall far short of the benefits of patent
protection.6" There is, however, protection against use by those who
have discovered the secret through unfairness or have used it in breach
of confidentiality agreements or fiduciary duties.
The scope of what will be characterized as wrongful disclosure or
breach of fiduciary duty may be extremely broad. Yet, the generality
of the information appropriated may limit the software proprietor's
ability to recover.6 2 The dividing line between the general and the se-
cret may not be easy to draw,6 3 but many cases have illustrated the type
53. Id at 919, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 613-14.
54. 510 F.2d 894, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 3 (10th Cir. 1975).
55. 338 F. Supp. 1229, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 462 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
56. Id at 1234, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 470.
57. Bender, supra note 34, at 4.
58. Id at 5.
59. "Reverse engineering" is the process by which a product is analyzed. and its
formula discovered. Laff v. John 0. Butler Co., 64 IUl. App. 3d 603, 616, 381
N.E.2d 423, 433 (1978).
60. Id
61. See Bigelow, Legal Aspects of Proprietary Software, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CAL-
LAGHAN) § 4-1, art. 1 (1968).
62. See generally Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 928-29, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 3, 59-60 (10th Cir. 1975).
63. Id
.204 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. II
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of conduct that may or may not be characterized as the appropriation
of secrets.
In Automated Systems, Inc. v. Service Bureau Corp., 61 the plaintiff
sued for wrongful use of trade secrets and business opportunity.
65
Plaintiff had developed a system for inventory control of auto parts
using data processing equipment, formed the plaintiff corporation to
develop and market the system, and entered into an agreement with the
defendant authorizing it to sell the system to auto dealers during a four
month "test sell" period.66 The defendant service bureau assigned one
of its employees (a man with wide experience in data processing and
systems analysis, but with no knowledge of the auto parts business) to
learn the defendant's system for preparation of a sales manual. De-
fendant undertook in good faith to perform the sales agreement but,
meeting with no success, exercised its termination option. Thereafter,
the defendant sold to Chevrolet dealers an inventory system similar to
that the plaintiff had designed, but utilizing components more accepta-
ble to Chevrolet.
The court found no wrongful use of trade secrets and no breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of the defendant. It was held that the de-
fendant's new system, designed by the same employee who had pre-
pared the sales manual for the plaintiffs system, owed its existence to
the auto parts know-how the employee had acquired while working
with the plaintiff.67 But the court regarded that know-how as the kind
of general information that an employee may take from one job and
freely employ in another, in the absence of a contrary agreement with
his former employer.68 Furthermore, in finding no breach of fiduciary
duty, the court placed great emphasis on several facts: the sales agree-
ment between the parties had terminated when the defendant's deal
with Chevrolet was made; the defendant had undertaken only to mar-
ket plaintiffs system as it was, without modifications; the defendant's
system was substantially different from the plaintiffs; and the plaintiff's
system, already installed prior to the defendant's sales agreement in a
number of dealerships, was well-known and was composed of elements
generally known and in use. 69 Absent the misuse of trade secrets, the
defendant was free to engage in the same eneral business as the plain-
tiff after the termination of their contract.n°
In contrast to the situation in Automated Systems, when a former
employee finds it necessary to remove documents and equipment from
the premises of his former employer, the court is likely to find that the
64. 401 F.2d 619, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 581 (10th Cir. 1968).
65. Id at 620, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep (Callaghan) at 581-82.
66. Id at 620, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 582.
67. Id at 625, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 589.
68. Id
69. Id at 623-24, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 586-88.
70. Id at 625, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 589.
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information so taken was not part of the general information the em-
ployee acquired on the job.7' However, an employee need not physi-
cally remove documents for the court to find that more than general
information has been carried away. An employee who spends a great
deal of time working on an item of software may well have committed
portions of it to memory, and "[an employee may well learn by heart
figures, plans, charts, formulae and so on; the fact that he is able to do
so should not mean that he should be able to claim the information as
his own knowledge."72 InA.- Emery Co. v. Marcon Products Co.,3 in
which the plaintiffs former employee reproduced blueprints of a hy-
draulic load cell from memory, the court found, "[I]t is as much a
breach of confidence for an employee to reproduce his employer's
drawing from memory as to copy them directly."74 Similarly, in Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 71 in which the defendant had memorized and
then copied a trade secret technique for producing silicon alloy junc-
tion transistors, the court remarked that it is irrelevant whether a copy
"came out in a defendant's hand or in his head. His duty of fidelity to
his employer remains the same."76
Courts will not hold a defendant liable for misappropriation of
trade secrets, breach of a confidential relationship or unfair competi-
tion merely because he entered into competition with his former em-
ployer. In Computer Sciences Corp. v. Ferguson,7 7 for example, a
California court found that a defendant was free to solicit customers of
his former employer because "such sales were not made because of the
employee's personal acquaintance with the customers and knowledge
of the peculiar likes, dislikes and fancies" but, rather, on the em-
ployee's ability to improve the quality of products offered by competi-
tors.78 The employee had the right to announce to customers, before
his resignation, that he was going to engage in business for himself and
to later use any information he had acquired during his employment,
which did not entail trade secrets. 79 Neither these actions nor the use
71. See, e.g., Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 646-47, 358
N.E.2d 804, 806-07, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 345, 347-48 (1976).
72. A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 169 (1962), quoted in Bender, supra
note 34, at 10.
73. 268 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aJJ'd, 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968).
74. Id at 300.
75. 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
76. Id at 563.
77. 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 813 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Cal.
1967), ajj'd, 74 Cal. Rptr. 86, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 823 (Ct. App.
1968).
78. Id at 815.
79. Id Similarly, in Reed, Roberts Associates, Inc. v. Strauman, the New York Court
of Appeals found that specialized knowledge gained in the computer field, not
involving trade secrets, could be used in competition with a former employer from
whom such knowledge was obtained; to hold otherwise would render specialists
"virtual hostages of their employers." 40 N.Y.2d 303, 309, 353 N.E.2d 590, 594,
386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 727, 727 (1976).
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of his former employer's customer list constituted a breach of duty. °
Of course, a manufacturer may readily prove breach of duty or
wrongful use of information if he can show that his employees or cus-
tomers agreed to keep such information confidential and not to use it to
compete. Some writers believe that written contractual commitments
not to disclose are the best form of protection available to the software
producer.8 ' Non-disclosure clauses in leases of software and in em-
ployment contracts are increasingly common and may assure producers
the right to injunctive relief or monetary damages when breached.
Such clauses, as all contractual provisions, must be carefully
drafted so as to render them enforceable, imposing obligations and lim-
iting employee and customer use to the extent desired. The absence of
certain terms from a contract may be taken as intentional, and the em-
ployee or customer may be free to disclose information or compete in a
way the manufacturer intended to prohibit. Restrictive covenants by
which an employee agrees not to compete may be unenforceable if the
applicable time and geographical area are not sufficiently limited. 2
Moreover, the mere act of entering into an employment relationship
with the competitor of a former employer does not, in itself, constitute
violation of a covenant not to compete. Restrictions on such new em-
ployment will probably not be upheld unless a plaintiff can show that
the former employee is working in an area of data processing indistinct
from that practiced by the plaintiff and in such a way as to constitute
unfair competition. 3
The difficulty that may arise in contractually limiting the terms of
a license granted to a customer is demonstrated by Systems Develop-
ment Corp. v. United States. 84 In that case, the National Library of
Medicine obtained a license to use the plaintiff's computerized health
information retrieval system 5 and allowed others, including represent-
atives of private pharmaceutical houses, to have access to the comput-
erized data, ie., to be put on line. The agreement between the parties
contained the following language: "The National Library of Medicine
80. 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 813, 815 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County
Cal. 1967), afl'd, 74 Cal. Rptr. 86, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 823 (Ct.
Aip. 1968). Use of a former employer's customer list for purposes of competition
w not be held actionable when, because of the modicum of care taken in pro-
tecting it and limited money and time expended in compiling it, the list does not
qualify as a trade secret. Republic Syss. & Programming, Inc. v. Computer Assist-
ance, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 619, 628 (D. Conn. 1970).
81. Bigelow, Legal Aspects of Proprietary Software, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLA-
OHAN) § 4-1, art. 1, at 8 (1972).
82. 7 COMPUTER L. & TAx. REP., June 1981, at I (citing Applied Data Processing v.
Petrillo, No. 184323 (New Haven Super. Ct. Conn. 1980)).
83. Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreadhris, 578 F.2d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978); Elec-
tronic Data Syss. Corp. v. Kinder, 497 F.2d 222, 224, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 729, 730 (5th Cir. 1974).
84. 531 F.2d 529, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 193 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
85. Id at 529-30, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep (Callaghan) at 193.
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agrees not to utilize licensed material in the performance of computer
service bureau operations nor performance of any services for third
parties except within its mission as established by law or regulations." 6
The plaintiff alleged that the licensee had breached its commitment not
to operate as a service bureau and had taken away customers who
would otherwise have dealt directly with the plaintiff. Holding that the
contract language was ambiguous, 7 the court found that services to
pharmaceutical houses were within the library's "mission," falling
within the contractual exception." Accordingly, software licensors
must make their intentions clear if they are to successfully enjoin dis-
closure of their information beyond the bounds they intended to
license.89
Contractual pitfalls notwithstanding, computer software producers
may successfully maintain suits for trade secret misappropriation and
breach of confidence, recovering both injunctive relief and monetary
damages against former employees, customers and competitors. A
number of cases illustrate the evidence required and the appropriate
measure of damages and form of injunctive relief.
In Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc.,9' the defendants had
worked for the plaintiff while it was developing a high speed data ac-
quisition module. 9' The evidence presented at trial established that the
defendants had removed drawings and a sample of the module from
the plaintiff's premises. Additionally, it was shown that while the
plaintiff had invested eighteen months and $100,000 in developing its
module, within a few months after the defendants left the plaintiff's
employment, they were able to produce a similar module for only
$2,500. Consequently, the court found that the defendants' success
came not merely as a result of the general increase and improvement in
skills acquired while working for the plaintiff, but as a result of their
unauthorized use of proprietary information. 92 In fashioning injunc-
tive relief, the court considered the time, according to expert testimony,
86. Id at 530, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 194.
87. Id
88. Id at 531, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 196.
89. Nevertheless, despite a contractual provision to the contrary, the defendant serv-
ice bureau in Smithsonian Inst. v. Datatron, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Calla-
ghan) 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), was unable to retain copies of Smithsonian's
computerized mailing list after the termination of the bureau's relationship with
Smithsonian. Id at 397. The court reasoned that the subscription list was essen-
tial to preserve the Smithsonian Magazine's good will. Id at 396. The court
futher observed that, in procuring the information in the data fie, the defendant
had acted solely as the plaintiffs agent and that it had procured most of the infor-
mation solely as a result of the efforts and expenditures of the plaintiff. Id It was
held that the defendant would not be injured by the injunction issued. Id at 397.
90. 371 Mass. 643, 358 N.E.2d 804, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 345 (1976).
91. Id at 645, 358 N.E.2d at 806, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Calaghan) at 346.
92. Id at 646, 358 N.E.2d at 806, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Calaghan) at 347. Addi-
tionally, the court believed that the defendants' actions, contrary to statements
they had made when they resigned that they were not taking with them any docu-
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that would have been required for the defendants to have reverse engi-
neered the plaintifis module, without having had access to trade
secrets.93 However, the court declared that the time required for re-
verse engineering should not become an inflexible standard for deter-
mining the reasonable length of an injunction not to compete. 94 Since
the defendants had been spared the costs of independent invention, the
court directed that on remand it would be appropriate for the defend-
ants to be ordered to pay the plaintiff a sum representative of the cost
of such independent invention and duplication. 95
In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc. ,96 the defendant-employees
had agreed in writing not to disclose or use confidential information
acquired during their employment with Sperry. 97 Nevertheless, in re-
sponse to an attractive offer by Pentronix, a year-old corporation with
no experience or personnel engaged in the manufacture of magnetic
memory cores, the defendants left Sperry, taking with them not only
intimate knowledge of Sperry's manufacturing process, but also docu-
ments and equipment, which had been clearly designated "Company
Confidential. ' 98 In contrast to the eight years of research and develop-
ment before Sperry could first market its magnetic memory core, Pen-
tronix was able to enter the market within five months after hiring
Sperry's employees.99 The composition of the Pentronix core was iden-
tical in composition to the Sperry model."°° Moreover, before Pen-
tronix had even produced any cores, it had announced its performance
data and test characteristics. 10' Based on this evidence, the court held
that Sperry was entitled to injunctive relief, an accounting and dam-
ages for profits lost as a result of the defendants' unfair competition
and breach of contract.1
0 2
Telex Corp. v. IBM"°3 provides a further example of trade secret
misappropriation accomplished by luring away a competitor's employ-
ees. In that case, Telex was able to enter the market for plug compati-
ble peripheral devices and to displace IBM products, far sooner than it
could have done by reverse engineering, through its hiring of key IBM
employees and inducing them to reveal IBM trade secrets."° The dam-
ages awarded to IBM included: the loss IBM sustained for rents of its
ments or materials belonging to Analogic, further established their liability. Id at
645, 358 N.E.2d at 806, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 346.
93. Id at 647-48, 358 N.E.2d at 807, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 348.
94. Id at 648, 358 N.E.2d at 808,.6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 349.
95. Id at 649, 358 N.E.2d at 808, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 350.
96. 311 F. Supp. 910, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 600 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
97. Id at 912, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 603.
98. Id at 918, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 613.
99. Id at 912, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 602.
100. ld at 920, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 615-16.
101. Id at 919, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 614.
102. Id at 923-24, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 620-21.
103. 510 F.2d 894, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 3 (10th Cir. 1975).
104. Id at 929, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 59.
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higher-priced device (a loss calculated according to the average
monthly rentals IBM would have enjoyed during its exclusive presence
in the field while Telex was still engaged in reverse engineering); the
approximate amount that IBM had already spent on development of its
device at the time its employees were lured away; and the money Telex
saved on another of its projects by employing IBM secrets.' 05 The
court refused to award IBM what had been alleged as increased secur-
ity costs - for guards' salaries, cameras, locks, etc."m It was held that
the causal relationship between those security costs and the defendants'
misconduct was too speculative because "Telex was not climbing fences
or breaking down doors in its appropriation of IBM's trade secrets."N17
In addition to successful trade secret misappropriation suits
against former employees and their new associates, successful actions
have been brought based on misappropriation by customers. For ex-
ample, in Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., '0 al-
though computer maintenance diagrams bore proprietary notices
restricting use to maintenance purposes only, the defendant had used
them to build and market its own minicomputer functionally
equivalent to that manufactured by the plaintiff. "o In the absence of a
showing that the defendant had been able to reverse engineer a sub-
stantially identical device, it was permanently enjoined from using
even its own designs to build and market one, and the case was referred
to the jury for an assessment of damages." l0
Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc. "' is an example of a
successful suit for breach of confidence and trade secret disclosure
against a former joint venturer. In that case, the parties had both been
engaged in the business of developing and marketing software and of-
fering use of computer systems on a time sharing basis." 2 Operating in
different areas of the country, they had not been direct competitors.' '
3
They had entered into a technical exchange agreement to share new
software developments and enhancements, agreeing not to lease, sell,
or divulge to third parties the information so acquired without the
other's written consent.' '4 Upon termination of the agreement, the de-
fendant initiated arrangements to sell its assets and good will to Tym-
share, Inc. Tymshare was a large and profitable competitor of the
plaintiff-corporation, which had sustained operating losses since its
founding. Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the defendant from further
105. Id at 931-32, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 63-65.
106. Id at 933, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 65.
107. Id at 933, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 66.
108. 357 A.2d 105, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1073 (Del. Ch. 1975).
109. Id at 107, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1075.
110. Id at 114, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1086-88.
111. 338 F. Supp. 1229, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 462 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
112. Id at 1231, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 464.
113. Id at 1237, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 474.
114. Id at 1232, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 467.
[Vol. 11
Proprietary Protection of Computer Software
divulging software developments, which the plaintiff had produced at a
cost of two million dollars and had only disclosed under the limitations
of the technical exchange agreement. The injunction was granted, with
the court finding a confidential relationship between the original par-
ties to the agreement and characterizing the plaintiff's software devel-
opments as unique property constituting trade secrets and supplied in
confidence. "5
A similar case, one that presented the court with an opportunity to
discuss the propriety of various measures of damages, is University
Computing Co. v. Lykes- Youngstown Corp. 116 In that case, the parties
were negotiating the formation of a partnership to provide computer
services. "17 The plaintiff had already developed and issued a restricted
license to a department store for use of AIMES III, its automated in-
ventory management evaluation system. It was this system the con-
templated partnership was to market. Negotiations ultimately broke
down, and the defendant formed his own subsidiary to provide the con-
templated services. By persuading an employee of the licensee-depart-
ment store to turn over the tapes and documents constituting the
AIMES system, the defendant was able to copy them and make the
system the object of the newly formed subsidiary's sales campaign.
The plaintiff successfully sued for misappropriation of trade secrets." 8
In considering the measure of damages, the court in University
Computing cited the need for a flexible approach, one looking to the
commercial setting of the injury, the probable consequences of the mis-
appropriation, and the extent of use to which the defendant put the
trade secret after misappropriation. "19 The court discussed a number of
methods for assessing damages, rejecting several before selecting the
one it found appropriate. In some cases, the court noted, the loss suf-
fered by the plaintiff would be a useful measure of damages, e.g., when
a defendant has published and thereby destroyed a trade secret.' 20 In
the instant case, however, that had not occurred. Another measure
would be the defendant's actual profits from his misappropriation. 12
But the subject defendant had been unsuccessful in marketing the pur-
loined system and, therefore, had received no profits. The plaintiff
115. Id at 1239, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 478.
116. 504 F.2d 518, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1248 (5th Cir. 1974).
117. Id at 526-27, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1250-51.
118. Id at 535, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1259.
119. Id at 538, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1265.
120. Id at 535, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1259-60.
121. Id at 536, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1260-61. The court indicated
that it might have awarded as damages what the defendant would have realized as
profits had he been successful; this measure would justly allocate to the defendant
the risk of his failure in marketing and would remove this risk from the injured
plaintiff. Id The court stated that "lack of actual profits does not insulate the
defendants from being obligated to pay for what they have wrongfully obtained in
the mistaken belief their theft would benefit them." Id at 536, 5 Computer L.
Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1261.
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could also have been awarded its cost in developing the stolen system;
however, in the context of the plaintiff's commercial operations such
costs would have been too difficult to ascertain. 22 The court finally
adopted, as the appropriate measure of damages, the reasonable cost of
a license to assemble and market the plaintiff's system.
23
Factors to be considered in the cost of a compulsory license in-
clude prices paid by past or current licensees, the plaintiff's develop-
ment costs, the importance of the secret in the plaintiff's business, the
nature and extent of the use to which the secret was put by the defend-
ant, foreseeable or resultant changes in the parties' competitive pos-
tures, and any unique factors that might exist, such as the ready
availability of alternative processes.' 24 Upon consideration of these
factors and the testimony of an expert in pricing software systems for
marketing, the court in University Computing set the value of rights to
use of the AIMES system - which the defendant was compelled to
purchase - at $220,000.125 The plaintiff was not required to prove any
lost profits; he only needed to show misappropriation and evidence of
the value of the secrets taken.
126
The wide latitude available in fashioning a remedy for the
wronged trade secret proprietor is also illustrated in International Data
Corp. v. Informat, Inc. 127 In that case, the defendants, who had been
charged with invading the plaintiff's computerized data bank, were en-
joined from retaining, selling, disclosing, copying or using the informa-
tion they had obtained (a list of computer users) and were ordered to
pay a judgment equalling any payment or benefits they had received by
using this information. 28 The accounting, upon which this judgment
was based, was required to include, inter alia, the most currently known
name, address and phone number of every person or firm to whom
data had been disclosed and an exact description of every copy made
by the defendants.
29
Despite successful suits such as those previously discussed, the
common law protection afforded software manufacturers is not always
sufficient. The burden of proof imposed on a plaintiff and the flex-
ibility of the courts vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. A plaintiff
may find it difficult, if not impossible, to sue the misappropriator who
does his deed in another jurisdiction. 3 0 Furthermore, trade secret mis-
122. Id at 538, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1264.
123. Id at 538-39, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1266. In arriving at this
measure of damages, the court noted that "the primary concern in most cases is to
measure the value to the defendant of what he actually obtained from the plain-
tiff." Id at 539, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1266.
124. Id
125. Id at 544, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1273.
126. Id at 543-46, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1272-77.
127. 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1163 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
128. Id at 1164-65.
129. ld
130. Because it is unfair competition rather than mere theft that the trade secret doc-
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appropriation is not always easy to detect. It will not always be the
product of a newly organized corporation that is found to be similar to
that of a potential plaintiff, and it will be more difficult to prove that an
established concern did not simply turn out a product through in-
dependent effort. Moreover, competitors and customers cannot always
be trusted to report the overtures of those seeking to market stolen
secrets. It is, therefore, not surprising that software manufacturers are
casting about for new methods of protection, finding encouragement in
the broad benefits and statutory damages available under federal pro-
prietary protection laws.
IV. PROPRIETARY PROTECTION UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A. Trademark Registration
In an effort to render their products readily identifiable and distin-
guishable from those of their competitors, manufacturers of computer
software have begun to seek the protection of the federal trademark
laws. 3 ' Although some of their efforts have met with definitional im-
pediments, an increasing number of software manufacturers are
achieving success in securing trademark registration.
The general applicability of the trademark laws to computer
software depends first upon whether the software constitutes "goods in
commerce," the statutory description of protectable subject matter.
32
Some software suppliers have already confronted this clause and found
it an insurmountable barrier. For example, in In re Shareholders Data
Corp., ' 33 the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals con-
sidered computer reports on the valuations of subscribers' securities
portfolios to be conduits for rendering a service. 34 As such, they were
held not to qualify for trademark protection as "goods in trade."' 35
Similarly, the Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board denied
registration to the petitioner in In re Compute-Her-Look, Inc., 136 hold-
ing that computerized beauty analysis printouts were part of a service,
rather than goods solicited in the marketplace for their intrinsic
trine is designed to prevent, the law of the jurisdiction where the defendant used
the stolen secret controls. Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc.,
357 A.2d 105, 113, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1073, 1085 (Del. Ch.
1975).
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
132. Id §§ 1052(f), 1127 (1976). In In re Shareholders Data Corp., 495 F.2d 1360, 5
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1123 (C.C.P.A. 1974), the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals used the phrase "goods in trade." Id. at
1361, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1123.
133. 495 F.2d 1360, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1123 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
134. Id at 1361, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1123.
135. See note 132 supra
136. 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 445, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 891 (Pat. Off.




In other instances, however, software manufacturers have success-
fully secured trademark registration. 38 For example, Data Packaging
Corporation was able to register as a trademark the narrow, colored
band it mounts on its computer tape reels.' 39 Although Data Packag-
ing may have problems in protecting any special techniques it uses,
customers will be able to look for its trademark and choose Data Pack-
aging tapes over the products of its competitors, once it has established
its reputation for quality.
Similar benefits have been experienced by Calvin Mooers, a
software producer who has registered programming languages he has
developed."4 The mark Mooers uses is TRAC, identifying his lan-
guages, standards and computer services.' 4' The trademark registra-
tion prevents other manufacturers from identifying their language by
the same name; 42 therefore, they cannot take advantage of the reputa-
tion for standardization achieved through the labor of the TRAC man-
ufacturers. While other programmers may appropriate and modify the
TRAC languages, users will probably prefer the standardization and
compatibility indicated by the name TRAC when they make subse-
quent software transactions.
Although trademark registration may have some potential for
checking unfair competition in the computer software industry, it will
not prevent competitors from wrongfully appropriating and using the
technology behind the non-copyable trademarks. For statutory help in
preventing such parasitism, the software industry has looked instead to
the copyright and patent laws.
B. Copyright Protection
Because a copyright normally affords the holder with the exclusive
right to reproduce, adapt, publish, perform and display his work, 143 it is
137. id at 446-47, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 893.
138. The field of available trademarks may be wide open to software manufacturers.
Since computer software does not compete with other everyday goods for the or-
dinary consumer's attention, it may be marked by names or symbols which would
be rejected (as so similar to other trademarks as to be likely to cause consumer
confusion) if associated with those goods. See note 142 infra
139. In re Data Packaging Corp., 453 F.2d 1300, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 396, 4 Computer
L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 104 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
140. See Mooers, Identocation of Programming Languages, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV.
(CALLAGHAN) § 4-5, art. 1, at 5 (1978).
141. Id
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1976). Subsection (d) prohibits the registration of a trade-
mark that resembles one that is already registered with the Patent and Trademark
Office if the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks determines that confusion,
mistake, or deceit is likely to result from any such resemblance. Id Additionally,
any person who commercially uses, reproduces, copies, or colorably imitates a
registered trademark so as to deceive or cause confusion or mistake can be held
liable in a civil action for infringement. Id § 1114.
143. 17 U.S.C. app. § 106 (1976).
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understandable that software manufacturers have eagerly sought this
form of protection for their products. The first deposit of a computer
program for copyright registration was made on November 30, 1961,
but it was not until 1964 that the Register of Copyrights decided com-
puter programs could be accepted for registration. '"1 In a circular pub-
lished that year, the Register stated that the applicability of the federal
copyright laws to computer programs would be weighed "in favor of
registration, wherever possible."' 45 Nevertheless, it was recognized
that the copyrightability of computer programs involved two "doubtful
questions": whether a computer program was the "writing of an au-
thor' and whether a reproduction of that program, in the form actu-
ally used to operate a computer, was a copy that could be accepted for
copyright registration. 47
The 1976 Copyright Act' 48 apparently answered both of these
questions in the affirmative.' 49 Additionally, the 1980 revision of sec-
tion 117 of the Act,15° precipitated by the recommendations of the Na-
tional Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works, 5 ' provided some clarification of the extent to which a copy-
144. See Note, Protection of Computer Software - 4 Hard Problem, 26 DRAKE L.
REv. 180, 192 (1976-1977).
145. Copyright Office Circular 31D (Jan. 1965), reprinted in 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 1167 (1978).
146. Id Whether a computer program or a data base is the "writing of an author" is
more than a mere question of semantics. Rather, this question lies at the very root
of copyrightability. The constitutional authority for enactment of a copyright
statute and for its application by the agency Congress delegates is article I of the
United States Constitution, by which Congress is given the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. It is patent protection which is extended to inventors
and their discoveries; copyright protection extends to authors and their writings.
See Note, Protection of Computer Software - A Hard Problem, 26 DRAKE L.
REv. 180, 184-96 (1976-1977). Thus, programs and data bases must qualify as
"writings of an author" before Congress may constitutionally grant them copy-
right protection.
147. Copyright Office Circular 31D (Jan. 1965), reprinted in 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 1167 (1978). Under the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35
Stat. 1075-88 (current version at 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-118 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)), to qualify his "writing" for copyright protection an "author" had to de-
posit two copies of a published work with the Register of Copyrights. Id § 12, 35
Stat. at 1078. The computer software industry had great difficulty complying with
this statutory requirement since' it was not clear that programs in machine reada-
ble form were "published" when disseminated or that, when deposited, they qual-
ified as "copies."
148. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-117 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The 1976 Copyright Act is the
first major revision of federal copyright law since 1909.
149. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ app. 101, 102 (1976)); see text accompanying notes 156-
78 infra.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
151. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978) [hereinafter cited as CONTU].
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righted program could be rightfully used and adapted by the owner of
a copy of that program. The Act fails, however, to set precise limits on
such use and does not specifically address the fair use that others may
make of copyrighted computer software. Moreover, unique problems
exist in the software field in detecting and, thereby, proving
infringement.
1. Copyrightability of Computer Software
In copyright law, a fundamental distinction exists between the ex-
pression of ideas and the employment of those ideas, the latter of which
is not a writing of an author that can properly be protected by a copy-
right. For example, in the landmark case of Baker v. Selden, 152 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff-author of a copy-
righted book was not protected from use by others of his bookkeeping
system, but only from their reproducing his expression of those book-
keeping ideas.153 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont s4 indicated that while
a copyright can prohibit anyone but the architect from copying a
blueprint, it does not prevent others from constructing the dwelling
pictured.
55
Section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act, consistent with the above
cases, provides that copyright protection does not extend to "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied" in the author's work.' 5 6 Rather, the proper
subject matter of copyright is "in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."' 7
Among works of authorship are "literary works."' 58 Congress has indi-
cated that this designation
does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative
value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual,
reference, or instructionalworks and compilations of data. It
also includes computer data bases, and computer programs to
the extent that they incorporate authorship in the program-
mer's expression o original ideas, as distinguished from the
152. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
153. Id at 104-07.
154. 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972).
155. Id at 899.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
157. Id § 102(a) (emphasis added). Thus, there is room for the copyright protection
to expand along with society's imagination.
158. Id § 102(a)(1).
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ideas themselves.1 59
Although, like other compilations, data bases may easily be viewed as
protectable literary works, it may be difficult to draw the line between
the copyrightable elements of style and expression in a computer pro-
gram and the process which underlies it. 6
The 1976 Act goes even further in clarifying the fact that repro-
ductions of computer programs can constitute statutorily prohibited
"copies." Previously, it was questionable whether unauthorized place-
ment of a copyrighted work into a computer, e.g., in the form of IBM
cards or magnetic tapes, amounted to the preparation of a copy in vio-
lation of the rights of the copyright owner.16' However, prior case law,
holding that something "is not susceptible of being copied until it has
been put in a form which others can see and read,"' 62 has been entirely
abandoned by section 101 of the new Act:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later de-
veloped, and from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. The term "copies" includes thematerial object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work
is first fixed.
163
A work is "fixed" if it is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration."'"
Two recent cases address the issue of whether a reproduction of a
copyrighted computer program in its object phase violates the 1976 Act:
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A1 Group, Inc. 165 and Tandy Corp. v.
Personal Micro Computers, Inc. 166 The courts in these cases arrived at
contradictory conclusions as to the Act's applicability to read only
memory (ROM) chips.
159. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5667.
160. Copyright Office Circular 31D (Jan. 1965), reprinted in 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 1167 (1978).
161. See Carey, Copyright Registration and Computer Programs, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 362, 364-65 (1964).
162. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Appollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908). In that
case, the plaintiff, a publisher of sheet music, could not recover for infringement
of its copyright because the defendant's perforated music rolls, for use in player
pianos, were not intelligible to human beings and, therefore, did not constitute
copies. Id at 18. See also Copyright Office Circular 3 ID (Jan. 1965), reprinted in
6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1167 (1978).
163. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
164. Id
165. 480 F. Supp. 1063, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
affdon other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1438
(7th Cir. 1980).
166. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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Although the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois held that the 1909 Act, rather than the 1976 Act, applied
in Data Cash, 67 the court believed that the definition of "copy" under
the 1976 Act applied to "computer programs in their flow chart, source
and assembly phases but not in their object phase, i e., the ROM."'' 68 It
was noted that section 101 of the Act defined copies as encompassing
works "which may be perceived 'with the aid of a machine or de-
vice.' ,1169 Because the court concluded that a computer program in its
object phase is a mechanical device rather than a protected work, it
stated that copies of the ROM would not fall within that definition.'
70
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted
on appeal that during the trial neither party had argued the point that
an object program was not a copy and, before the present court, neither
party was defending it. 17  Therefore, the court did not consider the
issue further and affirmed the lower court's decision that there was no
infringement on other grounds.'
72
In Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 171 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California expressly
disagreed with the dicta in Data Cash. 17' The defendant's duplication
of Tandy's copyrighted programs onto silicon chips constituted in-
fringement, in the court's opinion, because the ROM chips fell within
the 1976 Act's definition of copies. 175 In concluding that they were
167. 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-67, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1004, 1008-09
(N.D. Ill. 1979), affdon other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 1438 (7th Cir. 1980). The court believed section 117 limited actions
against infringers of computer copyrights to the law in force prior to the 1976 Act.
Id (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976) (superceded)).
168. Id at 1066 n.4, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1008 n.4. The develop-
ment of Data Cash's computer program for a computer chess game, Compuchess,
involved four phases: (1) creation of a flow chart; (2) formulation of a "source
program," which involved translating the flow chart into computer program lan-
guage; (3) translation of the "source program" into machine readable language,
called an "assembly program"; and (4) development of an "object program,"
which involved conversion of the machine language into a device commanding a
series of electric impulses. Id at 1065, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at
1005-06. This "object program," the read only memory (ROM), was then in-
stalled in the Compuchess computer as part of the circuitry. Id at 1066, 7 Com-
puter L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1007.
169. Id at 1066 n.4, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1008 n.4 (citing 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
170. Id
171. 628 F.2d 1038, 1041, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1438, 1441 (7th Cir.
1980).
172. Id at 1040, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1439. The court held that
Data Cash was precluded from recovering for copyright infringement because of
its failure to provide proper copyright notice. Id at 1042, 7 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) at 1443.
173. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
174. Id at 175.
175. Id at 173. "The technology of computers has reached the point where programs
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"fixed," so as to fulfill the requirements of section 102(a), the court re-
lied on legislative history:
"Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner
or medium of fixation may be - whether it is in words, num-
bers, notes, sounds, pictures or any other graphic or symbolic
indicia, whether embodied i a physical object in written,
printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or
other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception di-
rectly or by means of any machine or device 'now known or
later developed.' "176
Consequently, the court was not persuaded by the Illinois district
court's opinion in Data Cash that an object program is not a statutorily
prohibited copy." The Tandy court also held that the definitional sec-
tions protect a computer program, as a "work of authorship," and a
silicon chip, as a "tangible medium of expression." '78
2. Requirements for Copyright Protection
Just as the 1976 Act's definitional sections make copyright more
available, the formal requirements of the Act render such protection
more accessible to computer programmers. Unlike the old Act, Which
required publication with copyright notice and deposit with the Copy-
right Office of two complete copies, 179 the new law provides that copy-
right subsists from the first moment a work of authorship is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and that publication with notice is no
longer a prerequisite.' 0 Consequently, federal copyright law largely
pre-empts common law copyright,' 8 ' which protected unpublished
can be imprinted directly onto silicon chips. Those chips are then permanently
wired into the computer." Id
176. Id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprintedin [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665).
177. Id at 175. The Tandy court also disagreed with the holding of the district court in
Data Cash that section 117 of the 1976 Act was intended to limit owners of copy-
righted computer works to recovery based on the law existing prior to the new
Act. Id at 174-75. See note 167 supra The section was interpreted in Tandy,
based on the language used and legislative history, to apply only to "the problems
surrounding the input into computers of properly obtained copyrighted materi-
als." 524 F. Supp. 171, 174 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The court concluded that Congress
was only concerned with "'computer uses of copyrighted works.'" Id (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5731) (emphasis in original). The subsequent revision
of section 117, which prescribes the extent of permissible adaptation by the owner
of a copy of a computer program, supports the Tandy court's interpretation of the
earlier version of that section. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
178. 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (citing 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101, 102 (1976)).
179. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9, 12, 35 Stat. 1077, 1078 (repealed 1947).
180. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
181. Id § 301; H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 129-33, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5745-49.
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works from the moment of their creation. 82 Thus, producers of com-
puter software have rights in their original products prior to any regis-
tration and those rights endure for the life of the originator plus fifty
years. 
8 3
While registration is not a prerequisite to copyright, it is a prereq-
uisite to an infringement suit. 8 4 Registration may be obtained by de-
livering the required deposits to the Copyright Office, 85 along with the
Class TX registration form (for nondramatic literary works). 86 Gener-
ally, one complete copy of an unpublished work or two copies of a
published work must be provided to secure registration.'87 This de-
posit requirement would present an obstacle to registration of data ba-
ses and programs, which are constantly being modified and updated,
but for the statutory section allowing the Register of Copyrights to per-
mit, for particular classes, the deposit of identifying material instead of
copies.1 8 However, identifying portions of computer programs and
data bases must be submitted in a form visually perceptible without the
aid of a machine or device.8 9
Additionally, the 1976 Act requires:
Whenever a workprotected under this title is published in the
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright own-
er, a notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be
placed on all publicly distributed copies from which the work
182. M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHTS § 2.02, at 2-16 (1981).
183. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Moreover, when a work is made for hire, as is
the case with many computer programs, "the copyright endures for a term of sev-
enty-five years from the year of its first publication or a term of one hundred years
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first." Id § 302(c).
184. Id § 411(a).
185. Id § 408.
186. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(i) (1981).
187. 17 U.S.C. app. § 408(b)(1)-(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
188. Id § 407(c). The exception was enacted to provide "a satisfactory archival record
of a work without imposing practical or financial hardship on the depositor." Id
189. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A) (1981). The Copyright Office has specifically pre-
scribed alternative forms of registration for machine readable works. Id
§ 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)-(B). For computer programs in the form of machine reada-
ble copies, such as magnetic tapes, discs, or punched cards, the deposit must con-
sist of "one copy of [the] identifying portions of the programs ... the first and
last twenty-five pages or equivalent units of the program ... together with the
page or equivalent unit containing the copyright notice, if any," in a form visually
perceptible without the aid of a machine or device (on paper or in microform).
Id § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(B). For data bases, the identifying portions requirement
applies in a similar manner, except that in the case of an automated data base
comprising separate and distinct data files, fifty complete data records from each
fie or the entire file, whichever is less, must be submitted in visually perceptible
form. Id A typed or printed description statement must accompany such repre-
sentative portions of an automated data base, including, inter alia, the name and
content of each separate file within the data base, the origin(s) of the data, a
description of the exact contents and manner of display of any machine readable
copyright notice employed in the work, the frequency with which it is displayed
and a sample of any visually perceptible copyright notice placed on the work or its
containers. Id
[Vol. 11
Proprietary Protection of Computer Software
can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. 90
To fulfill this requirement, copyright indicia, 19' along with the date of
publication and the name of the copyright owner, "shall be affixed to
the copies in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of
the claim of copyright."' 92 The Copyright Office has offered four ex-
amples of acceptable methods for affixing notice upon works in
machine readable form: (1) a notice embodied on the machine reada-
ble copies so that when a visually perceptible printout is made, the no-
tice appears either with or near the title or at the end of the work; (2) a
notice displayed at the user's terminal when he signs on; (3) a notice
that is continuously displayed on the terminal; or (4) a permanently
legible notice reproduced on a label that is securely attached to the
copies, or to a box, reel, cartridge, cassette or other container used as
the copies' permanent container.
93
3. Use by Others of Copyrighted Computer Software
a. Adaptation and Copying by Rightful Possessors
When Congress passed the 1976 Copyright Act, section 117 was
originally enacted topostpone legislation on accepted computer uses of
copyrighted works,194 pending a report by the National Commission on
190. 17 U.S.C. app. § 401(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
191. Acceptable copyright marks include the letter "C" in a circle, the word "Copy-
right," or the abbreviation "Copr." Id § 401(b)(1).
192. Id § 401(b)-(c). Additionally, "[tihe Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by
regulation, as examples, specific methods of affixation and positions of the notice
on various types of works that will satisfy this requirement, but these specifica-
tions shall not be considered exhaustive." Id § 401(c). This section suggests that
there is room for the use of novel techniques for affixing copyright notice on data
bases.
193. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(g) (1981).
194. 17 U.S.C. app. § 117 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980)).
As originally enacted, section 117 provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this
title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or
lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with auto-
matic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring
information, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or pro-
cess, than those afforded to works under the law, whether title 17 or the
common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as
held applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this
title.
Id Computer uses of copyrighted works was defined as "the use of works 'in
conjunction with automated systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or
transferring information.'" H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5659, 5731. The House Report
notes that "[w]ith respect to the copyrightability of computer programs, the own-
ership of copyrights in them, the term of protection, and the formal requirements
of the remainder of the bill, the new statute would apply." Id
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New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). 19 5 The
Commission was created to provide recommendations regarding the
use of such works in conjunction with computer and machine duplica-
tion, including data base input and photocopying.' 96 In its formal re-
port on July 31, 1978, CONTU recommended that the new law be
amended so as to make it explicit that computer programs are copy-
rightable subject matter 197 and "to ensure that rightful possessors of
copies of computer programs. . .[could] use or adapt these copies for
their use."' 19 Permissible adaptations would include the making of a
machine language object program from a source program that a cus-
tomer had rightfully acquired.' 99 Permissible copying would include
the placing of the program into the computer's memory."° Such adap-
tation and copying would merely permit the customer to use the pro-
gram for the purpose for which he acquired it and in conjunction with
a computer to which he has access.2 ' "Rightful possessors" would also
195. See CONTU, supra note 151.
196. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5731.
197. CONTU, supra note 151, at 1. CONTU premised its support for copyright pro-
tection of computer software by pointing to its determination that a copyright had
the "smallest negative impact" upon economic factors such as protection of the
market, when compared to trade secret or patent protection. Id at 16-18. The
Commission found no evidence to support a contention that affording copyright
protection to programs facilitated the creation of monopolies by software firms.
Id at 23. Noting that the competitive industrial system allows entrepreneurs to
easily enter fields already occupied by firms doing business, the Commission
stated, "The absence of significant barriers to entering the program-market is
striking. There are several hundred independent firms whose stock in trade is
computer programs . . . . [No] firm is even remotely close to dominating the
programming industry." Id The Commission also found that copyrighting com-
puter programs would have a negligible effect on the retail prices of consumer
goods and services. Id at 23-24.
CONTU strenuously argued that no distinction could be made, for purposes
of determining eligibility for copyright protection, between programs which pro-
duce copyri.htable output and those which do not. Id at 21. In contrast, Com-
missioner Nimmer suggested, in his separate opinion, that copyright law ought to
exclude from the scope of its protection all programs employed in such tasks as
regulating traffic lights during rush hour or monitoring the vital signs of a patient
in intensive care. Id The Commission majority rejected this distinction since "it
does not square with copyright practice past and present, which recognizes copy-
right protection for a work of authorship regardless of the uses to which it may be
put." Id The Commission asserted that judgments on the artistic or literary
merit of works of authorship, always assiduously avoided by the courts, are inap-
propriate standards for determining copyrightability. Id at 25.
Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter, head of the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division, apparently agreeing that copyright protection for com-
puter software will not encourage monopolies, recently expressed plans to seek
even stronger copyright protection for computer software. See PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 571, at A-4 (March 18, 1982).
198. CONTU, supra note 151, at 1.
199. See id at 12-13.
200. See id at 13.
201. Id
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be allowed to make archival copies, to be used in case of destruction or
damage of the original due to mechanical or electrical failure.20 2 These
archival copies would have to be destroyed when rightful possession
ended or returned along with the original copy to the copyright own-
er.20 3 Under the CONTU recommendations, the right to make needed
adaptations would also explicitly include the right, notwithstanding the
copyright proprietor's exclusive right to prepare translations, to convert
the program from one higher level language to another and to add fea-
tures to the program that were not present at the time of rightful acqui-
sition. °4 Copyright proprietors not wishing to permit such adaptations
would remain free to contractually limit the use of their programs.
20 5
CONTU further recommended that section 117 of the new law be
repealed so that there would be no question that the placement of copy-
righted works into computers is the preparation of a copy and a poten-
tial copyright infringement. 206 In 1980, the section was reenacted to
permit owners of copies of copyrighted computer programs to make
new copies or adaptations provided:
(I) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essen-
tial step in the utilization of the computer program in con-
junction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archi-
val purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in
the event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful.20 7
b. Application of the Morrisey Doctrine to Copyrighted
Computer Programs
As previously stated, copyrights are intended to protect the expres-
sion of ideas, rather than the ideas themselves.20 8 Logically, therefore,
if only a very limited number of expressions of an idea are possible,
one may not restrict another's use of an idea by obtaining a copyright
on the language employed. This restriction has been designated the
Morrisey doctrine based on the case, Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble
Co. 21 In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that Morrisey had not infringed on Proctor & Gamble's
202. Id at 12-13.
203. Id at 12.
204. Id at 13.
205. id at 13-14.
206. Id at 12-13. Section 117 had raised questions as to the ability of software manu-
facturers to recover for infringement of their copyrighted works. See note 177
. upra
207. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980). A computer program is statutorily defined as "a
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result." Id § 101.
208. See text accompanying notes 152-55 supra.
209. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
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copyright by copying the latter's boxtop sweepstake rules almost verba-
tim because the number of ways to express such rules was extremely
limited.21 °
The Morrisey doctrine remains applicable under the new Copy-
right Act,2 11 indicating that copyright protection for computer pro-
grams will not forbid unauthorized use of language previously
copyrighted by other programmers when such use is necessary to im-
plement a particular process. 2  Consequently, programmers remain
free to recast ideas embodied in copyrighted language into other opera-
ble languages. 3 The degree of protection copyright law will afford
program proprietors depends, therefore, upon whether computer ideas
may be expressed in only a limited number of ways and upon how
difficult it would be for others to extract those ideas without copying
the proprietor's language. Some experts believe that countless ways ex-
ist to produce a program and that programming ideas can easily be
restated in another language.21 4 Yet others suggest that ideas in copy-
righted program language may be difficult to extract without using the
210. Id at 678-79. In Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cer.
denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit similarly reasoned:
[T]he use of specific language. . . may be so essential to accomplish a
desired result and so integrated with the use of a. . . conception that the
proper standard of infringement is one which will protect as far as possi-
ble the copyrighted language and yet allow free use of the thought be-
neath the language.
Id at 706.
211. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980); CONTU, supra note 151, at 20.
212. CONTU, supra note 151, at 20. The CONTU report states that "copyrighted lan-
guage may be copied without infringement when there is but a limited number of
ways to express an idea. This rule is the logical extension of the fundamental
principle that copyright cannot protect ideas." Id. (footnote omitted).
213. The CONTU Software Subcommittee recommended that infringement be found
in the case of unauthorized COBOL-FORTRAN translation (the communication
of business oriented problems to a computer). See Bigelow, Copyrighting Pro-
grams, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) § 4-3, art. 4, at 4 (1978). Yet, there is
some question as to whether program copyright proprietors should have exclusive
rights to prepare such translations. When human language is involved (e.g.,
French, English, etc.), it is possible to protect particular expressions of ideas with-
out restricting the free use of the ideas themselves. To move from FORTRAN to
COBOL, on the other hand, is essentially the use of ideas, first employed in pro-
grams for scientifically applied computers, in programs implementing business
use of computers. The translation is more of a science than an art; the mode of
expression so changes that nothing of the initial programmer's original expression
can be retained. To nevertheless give the original programmer exclusive transla-
tion rights is, in effect, to give him a monopoly on new uses of his ideas, which
copyright is not intended to protect. See Corasick & Brockway, Protection of Com-
puter-BasedInformation, 40 ALB. L. REV. 113, 126-28 (1975). The authors of that
article discuss machine encoding as translation, but their comments are pertinent
to the limitations of COBOL-FORTRAN translation.
214. CONTU, supra note 151, at 20 n.106. At a CONTU hearing, Dan McCracken,
Vice President of the Association for Computing Machinery, was asked how
many different ways there were to produce a program, and he replied, "An infinite
number in principle, and in practice dozens, hundreds." Id
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same or very similar language.2 15 A fair assessment of the limitations
imposed upon software competitors by copyright protection is perhaps
that it may vary according to the complexity of the program copy-
righted and the skill of rival programmers.
2 16
c. Use of Data Bases
The 1976 Copyright Act does not specifically address the scope of
protection afforded to data bases and the works contained therein.
CONTU noted, however, that section 106 of the new law would pro-
hibit the unauthorized storage of a copyrighted work within a computer
memory as part of the data base.217 Exclusive rights inhere in the pro-
prietor of the copyrighted input.21 8 Yet, as section 107 points out, some
"fair use" may be made of copyrighted works.2 19
The determination of whether a use is fair depends on the nature
of the work. CONTU believed that fair use would rarely apply to the
reproduction of copyrighted works in their entirety, unless authorized
by the copyright proprietors.220 Fair use would apply with similar rar-
215. Note, Protection of Computer Programs.- Resurrection of the Standard, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 333, 341 (1974). "To maintain the time saving factor while incorpo-
rating the basic premise of the old program into a schematically different yet func-
tionally equivalent new program would be difficult." Id
216. Although free use of the ideas presented in copyrighted expressions may not be
inhibited by copyright law, a copyright holder has the exclusive right to perform
his work publicly. Some writers have suggested that this right may afford pro-
grammers some additional protection. In Walt Disney Prod. v. Alaska Television
Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969), the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington held that the defendant's video tap-
ing of the plaintiffs program and dissemination of it through the defendant's
cable system constituted a copyright infringement in violation of the plaintiff's
exclusive right of performance. Id at 1075. One commentator has observed:
There is great similarity between capturing a dramatic work on video
tape and capturing a literary work (i.e. computer program) on computer
magnetic tape. By analogy, if the playing of the video tape constitutes a
performance of the dramatic work, the use of a computer magnetic tape
constitutes a performance of the literary work.
Prasinos, Worldwide Protection of Computer Programs by Copyright, 4 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS & L. 42, 67 (1974).
217. CONTU, supra note 151, at 39.
218. 17 U.S.C. app. § 106 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
219. Id § 107.
220. CONTU, supra note 151, at 39. Parties could enter into contractual or licensing
arrangements so that copyrighted works might be fed into computers, with any
limitations remaining a subject for negotiation. A copyright clearinghouse to ne-
gotiate group contracts between information users and copyright owners could be
developed, to facilitate contracts based on the terms reached between the copy-
right owners and the clearinghouse. Keplinger, Input of Copyrighted Works to
Computer Systems: The Casefor Invisible Copies, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLA-
GHAN) § 5-3, art. 4, at 15 (1973).
Since "authors" have traditional publication rights as well as the exclusive
right to place their works into machine readable form, a new form of original
publishing may even emerge. "There is reason to believe that machine-readable
data bases will largely replace their hard copy counterparts in providing. . . [in-
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ity to the reproduction of data bases by placing them in memory.221
That only one copy is being made, or even that the owner of
the computer system intends to exact no fee for providing ac-
cess to the work, would no more insulate the copies from lia-
bility for copyright infringement than would similar
circumstances msulate a public library which made unauthor-
ized duplications of entire copyrighted works for its basic
lending functions.222
Nevertheless, unauthorized placement of a complete work into a com-
puter's memory to facilitate scholarly research, e.g., making a concor-
dance to do syntactical analysis or criticism of a work, might not
constitute infringement. However, "[t]o prevent abuse of fair use prin-
ciples, any copy created in a machine memory should be erased after
completion of the particular research project for which it was made. 223
The purpose of so narrowly restricting the copying of works in
their entirety is to preserve the potential market for these works. There
are, of course, instances in which the principal way in which a work is
used is by consultation of its segments. Researchers using abstracts
rarely need more than limited portions of the volumes they consult.
Therefore, the standards of fair use would need to be more stringent
when portions of abstracts have been placed into a computer. On the
other hand, the input of insubstantial portions of works most often used
in their entirety could conceivably be fair. If the use in question would
have been fair without the aid of a machine, the principle should be
extended to use of the work in a computer.224
It is clear that one who purchases the right to retrieve data upon a
search request would infringe a copyright by retrieving the entire data
base and marketing a duplicate. At the other extreme, retrieval and use
of single items would certainly not constitute copyright infringement. 225
Yet,
[t]he retrieval and reduplication of any substantial portion
of a data base, whether or not the individual data are in the
public domain, would likely constitute a duplication of the
copyrighted element of a data base and would- be an infringe-
ment. In any event, the issue of how much is enough to con-
stitute a copyright violation would likely entail analysis on a
case-by-case basis with considerations of fair use bearing on
whether the unauthorized copying of a limited portion of a
formation to those] with substantial research needs." Squires, Copyright and Com-
pilations in the. Computer Era: Old Wine in New Bottles, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 18, 46 (1976).
221. CONTU, supra note 151, at 39.
222. Id at 40 (footnote omitted).
223. Id at 40 n.166.
224. See Lawlor, CopyrightAspects of Computer Usage, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
380, 400 (1964).
225. CONTU, supra note 151, at 42.
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data base would be held noninfringing. Fair use should have
very limited force when an unauthorized copy of a data base
is made for primarily commercial use.226
Courts have been persuaded more readily to find infringement in
cases in which there has been evidence of unfair economic advantage
or unfair competition. One writer has noted
that the permissible use made of a prior copyrighted compila-
tion by a subsequent compiler is narrower when the subse-
quent compiler is a competitor of the former. As the use
approaches the point of possible competitive disadvantage to
the copyrighted works - or at least dilution of its reputation
or uniqueness - the courts will be less inclined to condone
unverified copying. 27
Such was the rationale of at least one case viewed as discordant
with the general principles of copyright law.228 In Leon v. Pacjfc Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. ,229 a defendant's directory of telephone num-
bers in numerical sequence allegedly infringed the plaintiff's copyright
in an alphabetical city directory.230 Despite the fact that the defendant
inverted the names and numbers, the court found for the plaintiff,
based on the unfair economic advantage acquired through such prac-
tices.2 3 1 Thus, it may be surmised that when substantial portions of
data bases have been copied and used to the data base proprietor's eco-
nomic disadvantage, the courts may be inclined to find infringement.
What would constitute fair use of a data base will probably de-
pend, in part, on whether the data base has been published. Section
101 of the new Copyright Act defines "publication" and suggests that
whether a work is published depends upon the extent and nature of its
distribution.23 2 It is published if it is distributed under no explicit or
implicit restrictions and is thus available for further distribution or
public display.233 The fair use doctrine is applied more narrowly to
unpublished works "since, although the work is unavailable, this is the
result of a deliberate choice on the part of the copyright owner." 2"
A data base proprietor could conceivably avoid publication by
making his data base available only to particular users, placing restric-
tions on disclosure and transfer. He could then more substantially de-
226. Id
227. Squires, Copyright and Compilations in the Computer Era. Old Wine in New Bot-
tles, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 18, 28-29 (1976).
228. Id at 29.
229. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
230. Id at 485.
231. Id at 486-87.
232. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
233. Id
234. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975). This is part of the legislative
history of the new Copyright Act.
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limit "fair use" of his data. If, however, he authorizes further
distribution and public display of the data base, he will have published
and will thereby have less control over the fair uses to which his data
may be put.
4. Infringement: Proof and Recovery
As of this date, no decisions have been published defining the stan-
dards for finding copyright infringement of a computer program.235
However, it has been suggested that courts should consider the follow-
ing factors: the focus and purpose of the original and allegedly copied
program; any similarity in the operating sequences; the significance of
dissimilar material; common errors; and the appearance or repetition of
unique or qualitatively significant terms.236 "The appearance of these
elements, cumulatively weighed, would establish the inference of copy-
ing, which would shift to the alleged infringer the burden of establish-
ing the independent nature of his program.
237
These elements reflect the fact that one method of rendering pro-
gram copyright infringement detectible is for the proprietor to insert
identification akin to the fictitious addresses sometimes inserted in
copyrighted directories.238 Such a technique would aid in detecting in-
fringement when an entire work has been copied; however, this method
might be inadequate when only segments of a copyrighted work were
the subject of an alleged infringement.
In computer copyright infringement cases, courts may also experi-
ence difficulty in determining how much alteration must be done to an
original work before the altered work is no longer a copy.
It is not possible to define clearly how much or how many
changes can be made in an original copyrighted work and yet
be encompassed within the purview of a prohibited copy. The
most that can be definitely stated is that m order for a repro-
duction to constitute a copy the alleged copy must contain
some of the essential nature, substance or personality of the
author's original creation.239
235. In neither Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171
(N.D. Cal. 1981), nor Data Cash Syss., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
1063, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affd on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1038, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1438 (7th Cir.
1980), did the courts find it necessary to formulate a standard for infringement of
the copyrighted computer programs.
236. Note, Protection of Computer Programs: Resurrection of the Standard, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 333, 341 (1974).
237. ld
238. There may be no need to intentionally insert such bugs since most programs of
sufficient length include a substantial number of errors, giving them "their own
personalities." Galbi, Copyright and Unfair Competition Law as Applied to the
Protection of Computer Programming, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) § 4-3,
art. 1, at 13 (1978).
239. Id at 11.
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Whenever it is alleged that an infringing computer program has
been written by copying a copyrighted flow program, part of the test for
infringement should involve an analysis of the levels of detail in the
diagram and the allegedly infringing program.24 The "new" program,
which has not been sufficiently altered to lose the status of a "copy,"
should closely conform to the copied diagram in level of detail, which
can vary greatly. Whatever test is applied to detect adaptations, it is
clear that under the new copyright law unauthorized adaptations of
copyrighted works do constitute infringement, and defendants will
need to devote significant efforts to prove that their works qualify as
independent creations.
The remedies available to a copyright owner upon proof of in-
fringement include injunctive relief, 11 impoundment and destruction
of infringing articles, 242 and damages.243 The copyright owner can re-
cover the infringer's profits simply by proving the infringer's gross reve-
nue. The burden is then on the infringer to show that he had
deductible expenses or "elements of profit attributable to factors other
than the copyrighted work."' 244 Alternatively, the owner may elect to
recover statutory damages, which may range from $250 to $10,000 in
ordinary infringement cases and up to $50,000 in the case of willful
infringement. 245 The court may also award the plaintiff costs and rea-
sonable attorneys' fees. 2' Additionally, criminal sanctions are avail-
able for copyright infringement and fraud, including fines up to
$10,000 and one year maximum imprisonment.247
Copyright protection should be sought, if available, because of the
low costs of copyright registration 248 and the frequent success of plain-
tiffs in copyright infringement suits. 2 4 9 Under the rates effective Janu-
ary 1, 1978, the basic fee for registration of copyright claims is only ten
dollars, 250 and copyright plaintiffs prevail about seventy percent of the
time.251 When compared to patent claims - in which enormous attor-
neys' fees are incurred to prove a process is patentable subject matter
240. Id at 12-13.
241. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
242. Id § 503(b).
243. Id § 504.
244. Id § 504(b).
245. Id § 504(c).
246. Id § 505. Section 412 provides that statutory damages and attorneys' fees will
generally not be available when infringement occurs prior to registration or, in the
case of published works, prior to registration, "unless such registration is made
within three months after the first publication of the work." Id § 412.
247. Id § 506(a).
248. See id § 708.
249. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prod. v. Alaska Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
1073, 1075 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Prasinos, Worldwide Protection of Computer Pro-
grams by Copyright, 4 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 42, 51-52 (1974).
250. 17 U.S.C. § 708(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
251. Prasinos, Worldwide Protection of Computer Programs by Copyright, 4 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS & L. 42, 51-52 (1974).
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and plaintiffs succeed only about thirty percent of the time - the wis-
dom of securing a copyright, whenever possible, becomes apparent.25 2
C Patentability of Computer Software
The large number of articles published on the subject of computer
software patentability during the last twenty years illustrates the great
interest of both the software industry and the legal community in this
form of proprietary protection. 53 Patent protection is comprehensive,
surpassing copyright and trade secret law in its benefits to the holder.254
Patents would afford software manufacturers with protection for both
the substance and form of the inventive concepts embodied in com-
puter programs, giving the patent holders a limited monopoly on their
inventions, enforceable without a showing of unethical acquisition.255
These advantages make it easy to understand why the software indus-
try has sought to have its products included within the scope of federal
patent protection. 56 However, the questions of whether and to what
extent computer programs are patentable remain unresolved. Courts
and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) are constantly seeking res-
olution of these questions, within the precedents set and latitude left by
prior case law and the language and requirements of the patent
statute.257
252. A further advantage in obtaining a copyright is that it offers uniform federal and
international protection. Since 1955, the United States has been a member of the
Universal Copyright Convention, to which most industrialized nations belong.
The copyright protection afforded a work of authorship upon its publication with
notice in any one of the member countries is also given in the other member
countries.
253. For a comprehensive bibliography, see Nimtz, Development of the Law of Com-
puter Software Protection, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 3, 26-43 (1979).
254. Note, Patentability of Computer Programs, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 494, 496-97
(1973). See generally Nycum, Legal Protection for Computer Programs, 1 COM-
PUTER L.J. 1, 72-73 (1978).
255. Note, Patentability a/Computer Programs, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 494, 496 (1973).
256. Nevertheless, conflicting opinions exist as to the desirability of patent protection
for computer software. The hardware industry, perhaps the strongest opponent to
software patentability, Scaffetta, Computer Software Protection: The Copyright Re-
vision Bills and Alternatives, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 381, 393 (1975), cites two
adverse effects on that industry if software patents are allowed. The first is that
the existence of patent monopolies on computer software may impede effective
development and utilization of computers. Id Secondly, hardware manufactur-
ers believe that the acceptance of software as a machine process will lead to the
conclusion that the bundling of free software and priced hardware constitutes an
antitrust violation, as an illegal tie-in arrangement. Id at 394. In contrast,
software manufacturers assert that if patents are not allowed, software developers
will be forced to seek protection from state trade secret laws. Id at 394-95. More-
over, unpatentability allegedly thwarts university research and diminishes the
staying power of minority groups in the software industry. Id
257. The Patent Act of 1952 is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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1. Statutory Requirements
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that "[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
[the Act]." 258 A method, apparatus, or combination of the two may be
patented, including a new use of a known process, machine, manufac-
ture, composition of matter or material.2 59 However, the Act has been
interpreted to exclude mathematical, mental and logical formulae,
methods or steps, ideas, discoveries of natural laws or physical phe-
nomena, methods of doing business, and printed matter.2 60 The ques-
tion arising as to software patentability is whether such products fall
within the statutory classes of subject matter, which evolved before the
development of computer technology and, therefore, understandably
fail to expressly include computer software.26'
Any submission for patent protection must be novel, useful, and
nonobvious. The invention cannot have been previously "known or
used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country. ' 262 "Usefulness" has been in-
terpreted to mean that the submitted invention must do something, in
the technological sense.263 The Patent Act explains the nonobvious re-
quirement as follows:
A patent may not be obtained.., if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvi-
ous at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.26
258. Id § 101.
259. Id § 100(b) (1976). As terms of art in patent law, "process" is interchangeable
with "method" and "apparatus" with "machine." In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152,
161, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 52, 67 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Rich, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). "[G]iven an invention which is in es-
sence a new program for a general purpose digital computer, a competent
draftsman can readily define the invention as either a process or machine or
both." Id at 160, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 64 (Rich, J.,
dissenting).
260. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-72, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan)
256 (1972).
261. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 159, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 52, 63
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (Rich, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
262. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
263. See Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F. Supp. 7, 9, 115 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 408, 409 (D.D.C.
1957). Seegeneraly 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
264. 35 U.S.C. §103 (1976). In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the
United States Supreme Court shed some light on how nonobviousness is to be
measured. First, the prior art must be determined; next, the differences between it
and the claimed invention must be assessed; and then the ordinary level of skill in
the pertinent art must be resolved. Id at 17. Consideration will also be given to
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Sections 111 through 146 of the Act detail the procedure that a
patent applicant must follow. 265 Section 112, for example, requires the
applicant to disclose his invention with specificity:
The specification shall contain a written description of the in-
vention, and of the manner and process of ma ing and using
it, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carry-
ing out his invention.266
The successful applicant, as patentee, is granted "the right to ex-
clude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout
the United States" for a period of seventeen years.267 Sections 271
through 293 of the Act define patent infringement, 268 providing for a
"commercial success," "the failure of others," and "long felt but unsolved needs."
Id at 17-18. See text accompanying notes 373-77 infra.
265. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-146 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). A person seeking a patent must file
his application with the Commissioner of Patents so that the application may be
inspected by an examiner. Id § 111. The claim can be submitted and rejected
several times before it is refined to an acceptable level of novelty. Id § 132. If a
rejected claim is not prosecuted within six months, it is considered abandoned.
Id § 133. An applicant may take a twice-rejected claim to the Patent Office
Board of Appeals, id § 134, and, if denied relief there, he may either appeal to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals or bring suit against the Commissioner of
Patents in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id
§§ 141, 145. Should the applicant prevail in either of these courts, then a patent is
directed to be issued by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. Id
§§ 145-146.
266. Id § 112.
267. Id § 154.
268. Id § 271. The meaning of infringement has been defined by the courts through
the doctrine of equivalents. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339
U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950). Under this judicially developed doctrine, a court may
find literal infringement "where the infringing device . . . is identical to the sup-
porting disclosure of the patent or can be found as taught within the disclosure of
the patent." Scafetta, Programming Technology as an Infringement, 5 AM. PAT.
L.A.Q.J. 35, 38 (1977). However, if the infringing device "'performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result,'" a
patentee may invoke the doctrine of equivalents even if the infringing device is
not identical to or suggested by his disclosure. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Prods., 339 U.S. at 608-09 (quoting Sanitary Regrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280
U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). One commentator has noted that "the doctrine of equivalents,
which is especially applicable to a many-stepped process such as a computer pro-
gram, prevents a prospective infringer from avoiding infringement liability by
substituting for a part of the process its equivalent." Note, Patentability of Com-
puter Programs, 27 U. MIAMI L. R.Ev. 494, 496 (1973).
When a software inventor succeeds in obtaining a patent, how much practical
protection will it afford him? Certainly if literal infringement is found, as where a
software programming method is copied by an unauthorized infringer, the
software patent holder will be entitled to damages. Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United
Telecommunications, Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 899 (D. Kan.
1978). But the problem of the actual scope of protection arises because hardware
circuitry, which is the functional equivalent of software programs, might be
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civil action2 69 in which a patentee can recover damages "adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer."270
Despite the apparent inclusion of computer programs within the
statutory framework of the Patent Act, the PTO declared programs to
be unpatentable in its 1968 guidelines.27" ' The Patent Office rescinded
these guidelines272 largely because the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) refused to adhere to them.273 Nevertheless, the Patent
Office has continued to reject programming claims with some regular-
ity.2 74 The accessibility of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia2 7 has had less of a positive impact on software
patentability because this court has not shared the CCPA's liberality in
ordering the issuance of program patents.276 Only rarely has the
United States Supreme Court spoken on the issue and, on all but one
occasion,277 it has reversed the CCPA.2 7s Therefore, the status of pro-
gram patentability can best be understood in light of the history of Pat-
designed to carry out the same function as a disclosed software method or appara-
tus claim. Will such hardware be the legal equivalent of the software invention so
as to constitute patent infringement? This question may become increasingly im-
portant since "[i]ntegrated circuits now eliminate the need for software means in
special-purpose computers." Scafetta, Programming Technology as an Infringe-
ment, 5 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 35, 35 (1977)."Even though the present problem is just
beginning to generate litigation, it promises to foment greater difficulties as more
sophisticated programming technology, such as the integrated circuit, becomes
cheaper, faster, smaller and more versatile." Id.
Since the commercial debut of computer software and hardware, the
Supreme Court has not spoken on the effect of the doctrine of equivalents or on
the broadness of patent protection for means plus function claims. Id at 38. See
note 288 infra for definition of "means plus function." Some lower courts have
had occasion, however, to rule on this issue. E.g., Digitronics Corp. v. New York
Racing Assoc., Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), affid, 553 F.2d 740
(2d Cir. 1977); Bullard Co. v. General Elec. Co., 234 F. Supp. 995 (W.D. Va.
1964), aft'd, 348 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1965).
269. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1976).
270. Id § 284.
271. 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609-10 (1968).
272. 34 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1969).
273. See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 583 (C.C.P.A. 1968),
modoved, 415 F.2d 1393, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 32 (C.C.P.A.
1969).
274. Ross, The Patentability of Corputer "Firmware," 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 731, 753
(1977). "The PTO has established a separate classification for software-related
inventions, namely Class 444.. . .Few patents in Class 444, however, have been
issued, especially in recent years." Id
275. See note 265 supra.
276. Comment, Patentability: Piecing Together the Computer Software Patent Puzzle, 19
ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 354 n.23 (1975).
277. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), aj7'g 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
278. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 833 (1978),
rev'g In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 426
(C.C.P.A. 1977); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Cal-
laghan) 1133 (1976), rev'g In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 4 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 3
19821
Baltimore Law Review
ent Office Board of Appeals, CCPA and Supreme Court rulings on
programming claims.
2. The Decisional Debate Over Computer Software Patentability
The earliest reported decision involving software patentability was
Exparte King. 279 In that case, the Patent Office Board of Appeals af-
firmed the examiner's rejection of the subject apparatus claim,28 0 but
disagreed that "apparatus operating on particular stored data through a
particular stored program is . . .patentably no different than a com-
puter absent such data and program."'28' The Board suggested that the
combination of a computer program and the computer in which it is
stored during operation might be patentable as a single machine - a
special purpose computer - if the "prior art" of the computer did not
contain a suggestion for the preparation of such a program. 82
To deny patent protection to a novel structure it must be
shown that the same was obvious at the time the invention
was made. A program for a computer which is not made obvi-
ous by the prior art but only by appellants' disclosure is not
available to teach appellants' invention. Since most general
purpose computers have the recognized capability of simulat-
ing operations of many other computers or machines by suita-
ble programming, this fact should afford no basis for a denial
of a patent on all future novel computer configurations which
the art does not make obvious.
28 3
In its decision in In re Prater,28 the CCPA relied on King in find-
ing that an apparatus claim was patentable. 2 5 The applicants in Prater
sought a patent on an improved method for determining the relative
proportions of various known constituent gases in a gaseous mixture.
28 6
The patent application contained both process and apparatus claims.281
The process claims were a conceptual description of the analysis
method. The apparatus claim, on the other hand, was a general expla-
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256 (1972), rev'gln re Benson, 441 F.2d 682,
2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
279. 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 590, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 302 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1964).
280. The apparatus claim was rejected because the result or function could be accom-
plished "by routine application of the rules for handling data expressed in Polish
Notation," a system of denoting mathematical expressions that was not novel with
the applicants. Id at 591, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 305.
281. Id at 591, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 304.
282. Id
283. Id at 591, 1 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 304-05.
284. 415 F.2d 1393, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
285. Id at 1405-06, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 50-51. The apparatus
claim involved reading on a new use (programming) made of an old machine (a
digital computer). Id at 1399, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 35-36.
286. Id at 1395-96, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 34-35.
287. Id at 1398-99, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 44-51.
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nation of the performance of the process in "means plus function" lan-
guage.288 The specifications that accompanied the apparatus claim
described in great detail an analog device for performing the analysis
and also noted that a general purpose digital computer could be used to
perform the analysis.
2 89
The examiner and Patent Office Board of Appeals rejected all of
the method claims,2 90 finding that they were not patentable under sec-
tion 101 of the Patent Act because their novelty resided in a mental
process.29' This ground for rejection was based on In reAbrams,292 in
which the CCPA had held that processes having only mental novelty
are unpatentable because they fall outside the statutory "process"
class.2 93 InAbrams, the court rejected the appellant's patent claim on a
method for prospecting for petroleum because the novelty of the inven-
tion resided in the mental rather than the physical phase of the pro-
cess.294 From the Abrams case emerged the "mental steps" doctrine,
295
which formed the basis of many PTO decisions in the 1960's.
The examiner in Prater had found that each of the process claims
could be read on296 mental calculations and that the only novel subject
matter in the claims were those calculations which were outside the
288. Id at 1406, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 51. A "means plus function"
refers to any structure having the capacity to perform the function recited after the
words "means for." P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 14091] (2d
ed. 1982).
289. A general purpose computer performs operations by utilizing many different pro-
grams. A digital computer operates on numerically expressed data, performing
math as a person would. In contrast, an analog computer expresses quantities as
voltages, read from meters. Davis, An Overview of Computer Data Procesfing, I
COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) § 1-21, art. 1, at 2 (1979).
290. 415 F.2d 1393, 1398, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 32, 38 (C.C.P.A.
1969).
291. Id
292. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
293. Id at 169-70.
294. Id at 169.
295. The mental steps doctrine can be broken down into three rules:
1) If all the steps of a claim are purely mental in character, the subject matter
is not patentable.
2) If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as so-
called mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or advance over the art resides in one
or more of the mental steps, then the claim is considered unpatentable for the
same reason that it would be if all the steps were purely mental in character.
3) If a claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as mental
steps, yet the novelty or advance over the art resides in one or more of the positive
and physical steps and the mental steps are incidental parts of the process, Le.,
only essential to define, qualify or limit its scope, then the claim is patentable. Id
at 166.
296. "Reading on" is a shorthand phrase in patent law meaning that a broadly drafted
claim has described a machine or process other than that specifically designated in
the patent application. Note, Protection of Computer Software - A Hard Prob-
lem, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 180, 186 n.62 (1976-1977).
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statutory classes.297 The Board agreed saying, "It ... [is] beside the
point that the solution of the mathematical problem can be done by
machine. The claims have set forth nothing which cannot be per-
formed purely as a mental exercise using appellants' discovery that the
equations having the largest determinant are the ones to use. 29 8 The
examiner not only rejected the process claims as involving nonstatutory
subject matter under section 101 but also indicated that since the claims
read on subject matter outside the statutory class as well as within the
class, the claims failed "to particularly point out and distinctly claim
the invention,"2 99 thus failing to meet the requirements of section 112.
For similar reasons, the examiner also rejected the apparatus
claim. The basis of the rejection was that the claim merely involved
programming a general purpose digital computer to perform the (un-
patentable) required mathematical operations."° The claim also failed
under section 103 of the Act because it would have been obvious to
program a general purpose digital computer, which had been known
and in public use.3°1 Had the applicants' claim merely read on an ana-
log device, it would have been patentable. °2 By disclosing both the
digital computer and analog device, however, the applicants again
failed under section 112 to particularly point out and distinctly claim a
patentable invention.
In contrast to the Board, the CCPA distinguished the Prater pro-
cess claims from those in Abrams. Abrams, the court said, disclosed a
process that could be performed only in the mind. "Abrams had dis-
closed no means whatever for performing, without human intervention,
two claimed steps of calculation and comparison. '3 3 In Prater, how-
ever, there was "full disclosure of at least analog apparatus for carrying
out the claimed steps without requiring any steps to be performed in the
human mind" 3  The court found, therefore, that the appellants had
disclosed a statutorily patentable process.3 5 However, the court went
on to reject the method claims since the disclosure had not expressly
limited the claims to show that the applicants were not seeking cover-
age on a purely mental process.306 The court declined to read limita-
tions into the claim.30 7 Thus, pursuant to section 112, the specification
failed to distinctly point out the subject matter of the purported inven-
tion even though a patentable machine-implemented process was
297. 415 F.2d 1393, 1398-99, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 32, 38 (C.C.P.A.
1969).
298. Id at 1398, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 39.
299. Id at 1399, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 39-40.
300. Id at 1399, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 40.
301. Id
302. Id at 1399, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 41.
303. Id at 1401-02, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 44.
304. Id at 1402, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 44 (emphasis in original).
305. Id at 1403, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 47.
306. Id at 1404-05, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 47-50.
307. Id at 1405, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 49.
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disclosed.30
Additionally, the CCPA disagreed with the examiner and allowed
the apparatus claim stating:
Assuming the existence, at the time of the invention, of gen-
eral-purpose digital computers as well as typical program-
ming techniques therefor, it is nevertheless p am that
appellants' invention. . . was not obvious. . ..because one
not having knowledge of appellants' discovery simply would
not know what to program the computer to do.
3°9
In so reasoning, the court upheld the finding in King that novel ways of
programming a computer could be patentable apparatus claims. Addi-
tionally, although the court rejected the method claims, it did not do so
without restricting application of the mental steps doctrine to processes
requiring mental implementation.3 10 The court also suggested a way in
which applicants might amend defective claims: by clearly limiting
them to machine implementation of the process that could be done
mentally.31' Thus, the CCPA eliminated the mental steps doctrine as
an absolute obstacle to program patentability and illustrated its willing-
ness to extend patent protection to computer programs.
In In re Bernhar,3 12 the CCPA took a further step toward broadly
extending patentability to computer software. In that case, the appli-
cants sought a patent on a method and apparatus for converting a
three-dimensional object into a two-dimensional portrayal.1 3 Their
disclosure provided equations definitive of the geometric relationships
between the three-dimensional and two-dimensional coordinates of
points to be portrayed. These equations were programmable into a
computer. The examiner and the Board rejected both the apparatus
and method claims.314 The apparatus claims were rejected because
their only novelty lay in the equations disclosed, which did not create a
structural difference over the prior art.315 Additionally, the PTO held
that the applicants' apparatus type was old since it only combined a
digital computer with a plotting device.31 6 Similarly, the method
claims were rejected because their novelty also existed only in the
equations to be solved, the method thus reading on nonstatutory sub-
ject matter.317
On appeal, however, the CCPA allowed the apparatus claims.3 1
308. Id
309. Id at 1406, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 51.
310. Id at 1403, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 46-47.
311. Id at 1404-05, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 48-49.
312. 417 F.2d 1395, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 359 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
313. Id at 1396, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 360.
314. Id at 1398, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 363-64.
315. Id
316. Id at 1398, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 363.
317. Id at 1398-99, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 364.
318. Id at 1399-1400, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 364-67.
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It was noted that no "mental steps" issue was involved because the
means plus function language of the claims did not require or permit
the incorporation of human faculties. 319 Recognizing that Congress in-
tended to exclude mathematical equations from monopolization by
patent, the court stated, "Accordingly, no rule of law should be an-
nounced which would impress a monopoly upon all uses of the equa-
tions disclosed by appellants ... ."2o But the court added:
To allow the claims in issue here would not prohibit all uses
of those equations . . . . [A] member of the public would
have to do much more than use the equations to infringe any
of these claims. He would have to use them in the physical
equipment recited in the claim. Moreover, all machines func-
tion according to laws of physics which can be mathemati-
cally set forth if known. We cannot deny patents on machines
merely because their novelty may be explained in terms of
such laws . . . . We should not penalize the inventor who
makes his invention by discovering new and unobvious math-
ematical relationships which he then utilizes in a machine, as
against the inventor who makes the same machine by trial and
error and does not disclose the laws by which it operates.32'
In response to the objection that the apparatus was structurally the
same as an "old" computer, the court observed:
[I]f a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious
way, it is physically different from the machine without that
program; its memory elements are differently arranged. The
fact that these physical changes are invisible to the eye should
not tempt us to conclude that the machine has not been
changed. If a new machine has not been invented, certainly a
"new and useful improvement" of the unprogrammed
machine has been, and Congress has said. . .that such im-
provements are statutory subject matter for a patent. It may
well be that the vast majority of newly programmed machines
are obvious to those skilled m the art and hence unpatentable
... . We are concluding here that such machines are statu-
tory under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that claims defining them
must be judged for patentability in light of the prior art.322
The court also found that the method, disclosing the use of both a digi-
tal computer and a planar plotting apparatus, was statutory.323 A find-
ing that the claimed process could have been done mentally would
have required the court "to hold that the human mind is a digital com-
319. Id at 1400, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 366.
320. Id at 1399, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 365.
321. Id at 1399-1400, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 365-66 (emphasis in
original).
322. Id at 1400, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 366-67.
323. Id at 1401, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 368.
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puter or its equivalent," and this the court was unwilling to do.3 2 4
Three months after its Bernhart decision, the CCPA upheld, in In
re Mahon, 325 the applicant's method claim on a process for automati-
cally synchronizing a receiver of digital information to carry out a logi-
cal process on a bit stream.32 6 Although there was no express reference
in the process claim to a machine-implemented process, the term "bit
stream" had "a meaning in the art which precludes reading the claims
on a mentally performable process. ' 327 The court distinguished Prater,
in which it was unclear whether coverage was sought for mental or
machine implementation of the process disclosed.3 2s Through its com-
ments in Mahony, the CCPA suggested that computer programs may
be patentable if the inventor expressly or implicitly specifies them as
processes that are to be performed without mental intervention.
Prater, Bernhart and Mahony illustrate the CCPA's early view that
both newly programmed machines (apparatus) and logical steps or
equations (process) were patentable as statutory subject matter,
whether expressly or implicitly reading on the use of a machine, if they
were nonobvious in light of the prior art and distinctly claimed. These
cases severely eroded the mental steps doctrine, which was thereafter
completely abandoned in In re Musgrave. 3 29 Instead, the technological
arts doctrine, initiated in Prater, mandated that
patent protection for a process disclosed as being a sequence
or combination of steps, capable of performance without
human intervention and directed to an industrial technology
- a "useful art" within the intendment of the Constitution -
is not precluded by the mere fact that the process could alter-
natively be carried out by mental steps.
324. Id at 1401, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 367-68.
325. 421 F.2d 742, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 587 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
326. Id at 746, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 592-93. A "bit" is an abbrevi-
ation for "binary digit." Id In a "bit stream," bits are transmitted over a circuit
in a consecutive line, character separation being accomplished by terminal equip-
ment. Id
327. Id at 746-47, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 594.
328. Id at 747-48, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 593-94.
329. 431 F.2d 882, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 920 (C.C.P.A. 1970). In
Musgrave, the applicants sought a patent on a method for obtaining seismograms
that delineated with a high degree of precision the nature of the subsurface forma-
tions in the earth's crust. Id at 882, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 920.
All the patent claims were method claims and were rejected by the Patent Office
because either all or some of the steps of the claims were "mental steps" and were
relied on for patentability. Id at 888, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at
925-26. Despite Prater, Mahony, and Bernhart, the CCPA reversed the PTO,
dealing the mental steps doctrine its seemingly final blow. See id. at 888-90, 2
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 930-33. However, the mental steps doc-
trine apparently has been at least partially resurrected in Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256 (1972). See text accompa-
nying notes 333-49 infra.
330. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1389, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 583, 593 (C.C.P.A. 1968),
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Applying the technological arts doctrine, the CCPA continued to re-
verse the Patent Office Board of Appeals' decisions denying software
patentability33' until the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Gottschalk v. Benson. 
332
In Benson, the inventor had done work in developing a telephone
switching system known as PBX.333 PBX was "designed to intercon-
nect telephones using electrical dial impulses emanating from the call-
ing telephone which, because of their binary coded decimal (BCD)
form, required conversion to binary form in a control unit before inter-
connection with the called telephone could occur. ' 334 A number of
techniques for carrying out such a required conversion already existed,
but using them in PBX was either impossible or unfeasible. Benson
and his co-inventor, Tabbot, sought and finally discovered a new
method of converting BCD representations into binary number repre-
sentations. In their patent application, they detailed the problems
posed by prior conversion methods and the specific advantages of their
new process, such as "elimination of 'repetitive storing and retrieval';
modred, 415 F.2d 1393, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 32 (C.C.P.A.
1969). The Musgrave court said that method claims are not nonstatutory
merely because some or all the steps therein can also be carried out in or
with the aid of the human mind or because it may be necessary for one
performing the processes to think. All that is necessary. . . to make a
sequence of operational steps a statutory "process" within 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with
the constitutional purpose to promote the progress of "useful arts."
In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 920,
938 (C.C.P.A. 1970). Thus, the Musgrave court eliminated the notion that
machine rather than mental implementation was determinative in deciding
whether a method was statutory under § 101 of the Patent Act. Id Though no
assurance could be had that the Patent Office Board of Appeals would consider
programming statutory subject matter, it seemed clear that as far as the CCPA
was concerned, any process used in the field of electronic data processing that
heralded progress would be patentable as long as it met the other statutory re-
quirements, such as nonobviousness, novelty and sufficient disclosure. Note, Pro-
tection of Computer Programs: Resurrection of the Standard, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 333, 337 (1974).
331. In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 173
(C.C.P.A. 1972) (a method of analyzing data words to determine the number of
"ones" they contain), vacated, 559 F.2d 611, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Calla-
ghan) 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Mcllroy, 442 F.2d 1397, 3 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) 81 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (a method for retrieving symbolic data from
a stored string); In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Calla-
ghan) 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (a method of converting binary coded decimal repre-
sentations into binary number representations), rev'd sub nom Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256 (1972); In re
Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 994 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
(a process to compensate for distortion in seismograms).
332. 409 U.S. 63, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256 (1972), rev'g In re Benson,
441 F.2d 682, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
333. Soltysinski, Computer Programs and Patent Law:. A Comparative Study, 3
RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 1, 28 (1973).
334. Id
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enhanced accuracy by 'eliminating the need for interchanging signals
among various equipment components'; and accomplishment of con-
version without the need for 'auxiliary equipment.'""
Despite the apparent usefulness of the invention, the Patent Office
Board of Appeals rejected the claims, as basically mental in character,
because the method was directed to mathematical steps.3 36 Reversing
the Board's decision, the CCPA conceded that the process could be car-
ried out manually, but noted that the inventor had disclosed machine
implementation and that manual performance would be improbable.337
The court believed that a reasonable interpretation of the claims would
not include coverage of the process as implemented by the human
mind since the claims had no practical use other than through utiliza-
tion of a digital computer.338 Because the process enhanced the opera-
tion of such a machine, the court held the invention was clearly within
the technological arts and, thereby, a statutory process.
339
The CCPA's interpretation of patentable subject matter was quick-
ly circumscribed when the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Benson decision, holding the patent invalid as an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula.3 ° The patent claims were unanimously 34I re-
jected on two seemingly inconsistent grounds. First, the Court objected
to the overly broad nature of the claims:
The claims were not limited to any particular art or technol-
ogy, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any par-
ticular end use.
a . . Here the "process" claim is so abstract and sweeping
as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to
pure binary conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the
operation of a train to verification of drivers' licenses to re-
searching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed
through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery
or without any apparatus.342
In calling the Benson claim "abstract" and "sweeping," the Court sug-
gested that there was no limitation of the claim so as to confine the
335. Id at 29 n.119.
336. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 684, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1030, 1034
(C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'dsub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 3 Computer L.
Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256 (1972).
337. Id at 687, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1039. The court also noted
that although cash registers and adding machines also operate with numbers, this
fact has never been considered a basis for declaring them to be nonstatutory sub-
ject matter. Id
338. Id
339. Id at 688, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1041.
340. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256
(1972).
341. Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell took no part in the decision.
342. Id at 64-68, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 256-59.
19821
Baltimore Law Review
sought after monopoly within definite bounds.34 3
The Supreme Court's second objection was that the claimed pro-
cess had "no substantial practical application except in connection with
a digital computer."3" It was believed that affirming the judgment be-
low would be to permit the patenting of an idea - the mathematical
formula - and, in effect, to grant a patent on the algorithm
345 itself.3 "6
The Court's apparent inconsistency in objecting to both the "sweeping"
nature of the claim and its limited practical application raises questions
as to the validity of the Court's reasoning.
Although some commentators believed that the Benson decision
stigmatized software patentability, 347 others found solace in the follow-
ing statement by the Court:
34
We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it
343. Id Contrary to the CCPA's prior decisions in Mahony and Musgrave, see text
accompanying notes 325-29 supra, after Benson, mental and process claims so
broadly written that they may include both known and unknown uses will not be
statutory subject matter, even if they advance the technological arts. Therefore,
most processes will probably have to be tied to a specific Machine. However, the
Supreme Court did indicate in Benson that under certain conditions a process not
tied to a particular apparatus might be patentable: "Transformation and reduc-
tion of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines." 409 U.S. 63, 70, 3 Com-
puter L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256, 261 (1972). The Court thus breathed new life
into the "change of state" doctrine, which had its origin in Cochrane v. Deneer, 94
U.S. 780 (1876). See Elacqua, In re Johnston: Patentability of Computer
Software-7he Battle Rages On, 2 OHio N.U.L. REv. 782, 785 (1975). The trans-
formation test far antedates the computer age. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Procter, 102
U.S. 707, 721 (1880). In applying that test in Benson, the Court decided the ques-
tion of patentability of an intangible (a computer program) using standards estab-
lished in cases based on tangible inventions. A better approach would have been
to develop new standards of patentability that applied specifically to software in-
ventions based on the policy considerations developed in the prior cases.
Even without the development of a new standard as a means of adjudicating
Benson, the Court might have arrived at a different holding had it actually ap-
plied the transformation test to the Benson claim. The Benson claim met the re-
quirements of the test, so the Court's holding suggests that either it failed to apply
the test or applied it incorrectly because of its failure to understand the effect of a
program on the operation of a computer. Such an understanding is "crucial to
intelligent evaluation of the patentability issue." Note, Protection of Computer
Programs. Resurrection of the Standard, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 333, 339 (1974).
344. 409 U.S. 63, 71-72, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256, 262-63 (1972).
345. An algorithm is a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem by
converting one form of numerical representation into another. Id at 65, 3 Com-
puter L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 257.
346. Id This rationale for the Court's decision has generated comment by both courts
and legal scholars. See In re Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1239, 6 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) 787, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Soltysinski, Computer Programs and
Patent Law A4 Comparative Study, 3 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 1, 49-52
(1973); Comment, Computer Program Class#Fcation." A Limitation on Program Pat-
entability as a Process, 53 OR. L. REv. 501, 521-30 (1974).
347. See Note, Protection of Computer Programs. Resurrection of the Standard, 50 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 333, 339-40 (1974).
348. Id at 338.
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did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents. It is
said that the decision precludes a patent for any program
servicing a computer. We do not so hold. It is said that we
have before us a program for a digital computer but extend
our holding to programs for analog computers. We have,
however, made clear from the start that we deal with a pro-
gram only for digital computers. It is said we freeze process
patents to old technologies, leaving no room for the revela-
tions of the new, onrushing technology. Such is not our
purpose.349
Because of these disclaimers, the effect of Benson on software patenta-
bility was unclear. Furthermore, the CCPA's subsequent interpreta-
tions severely narrowed the Court's holding.
Six months after Benson, the CCPA decided In re ChristenseL 350
In that case, the method claimed was a process for determining subsur-
face porosity.35' The Board rejected the claim because the alleged ad-
vance over the prior art resided in nonstatutory subject matter - the
application of a formula to calculate values of a known parameter.35 2
Although Christensen's invention was not a computer program, the
CCPA held, based upon Benson,353 that the method claim, in which the
novelty was a mathematical equation to be solved as the final step, was
349. 409 U.S. 63, 71, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256, 262 (1972).
350. 478 F.2d 1392, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 66 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
351. Id at 1392, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 66.
352. Id at 1393, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 67.
353. Id at 1393, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Calaghan) at 69-70. Judge Rich, who
wrote the CCPA's decision in Benson, remarked in his concurring opinion in
Christensen that after framing the issue in Benson as "whether the method de-
scribed and claimed is a 'process' within the meaning of the Patent Act," the
Supreme Court never again adverted to the issue, but instead discussed the pat-
entability of programs for digital computers, despite the fact that no program was
before the Court. Id. at 1395, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 71 (Rich,
J., concurring). This fact raises the possibility that the Supreme Court's consider-
ation of software patentability in Benson could be viewed merely as dicta. Elac-
qua, In re Johnston: Patentability of Computer Software - The Battle Rages On, 2
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 782, 785 (1975).
Judge Rich believed that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Benson had more
bearing on the Christensen claim than on the Benson claim, in that the Christensen
claim contained a mathematical formula whereas, in Rich's view, the Benson
claim did not. 478 F.2d 1392, 1396, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 66, 72
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (Rich, J., concurring). Being obliged "under the rules of the legal
game ... to follow [the Supreme Court's] lead as best we can," i, Rich agreed
that the Christensen claim was not patentable, but he gave a hint regarding the
CCPA's inclinations in future decisions by adding:
But for the Benson decision, I would reverse the rejection here because I
see no reason why such a specific, useful technological process as a pro-
cess for determining subsurface porosity, concededly a contribution to
the useful arts, cannot be defined in the language of mathematics which
is widely used as a medium of communication in that field. I have no
more doubt that it is a "process" within the meaning of§ 101 than I had
about Benson's process. ...




A few months later, the CCPA indicated in In re Knowlton 355 that
it would continue to grant patents to computer programs when framed
as apparatus claims. 356 The invention in that case was a system for the
computer processing of list information, to be used with a general pur-pose digital computer.357 Shortly thereafter, in In re Comstock,P35 the
CCPA again allowed an apparatus claim on an electronic calculator.359
The application disclosed that retrieval of numerical data placed into
storage on a first-in, first-out basis could be effected through the proper
programming of an IBM 1620 computer.3 ° Despite the Patent Office
Board of Appeals' rulings to the contrary,36' the CCPA apparently be-
lieved that the failure to tie the means to a specifically named and de-
tailed computer system does not render a programming apparatus
claim unpatentable under section 112.362 In both Comstock and Knowl-
354. 478 F.2d 1392, 1396, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 66, 70 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
355. 481 F.2d 1357, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 799 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
356. Id at 1368-69, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 815-16.
357. Id at 1358-61, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 800-05.
358. 481 F.2d 905, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 818 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
359. Id at 909-10, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 824.
360. id at 906-07, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 818-21.
361. In re Comstock, 481 F.2d 905, 908-09, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 818,
821-23 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 1361-63, 4 Computer L.
Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 799, 805-08 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
362. 481 F.2d 905, 909, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 818, 823-24 (C.C.P.A.
1973). It is also significant that the CCPA supported its decision in Comstock by
citing Bernhart, which the court apparently considered still valid despite the Ben-
son decision. See id One commentator has phrased the impact of Knowlton and
Comstock more cautiously: "The language of the court ... may lead to the con-
clusion that programs are patentable at least in situations where patent claims are
so drawn that they direct attention to a specific computer as it is altered by the
particular program." Comment, Patentability: Piecing Together the Computer
Software Patent Puzzle, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 368 (1975).
During the same time period as Knowlton and Comstock, the CCPA also
decided In re Doyle, 482 F.2d 1385, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 933
(C.C.P.A. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 935 (1974), and, shortly thereafter, In re
Brandstadter, 484 F.2d 1395,4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 976 (C.C.P.A.
1973). In Doyle, the invention was a method for automatically producing data for
garment patterns of all desired sizes from a single reference pattern; the method
was carried out by means of a digital computer. 482 F.2d at 1386, 4 Computer L.
Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 934. The CCPA affirmed the Board's rejection of the
claim because the applicant had not described how the computers were operated
so as to enable a skilled programmer to prepare a program to use the disclosed
methods. Id at 1390, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 941. In Brand-
stadter, the invention claimed was an apparatus for allowing subscribers of a
communications system to store and retrieve previously originated data messages.
484 F.2d at 1396, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 977. The CCPA af-
firmed the Board's § 112 rejection of the claim on the grounds that the appellants
had failed to disclose the elements of a stored program making up part of the
apparatus and had failed to indicate the amount of time and level of skill which
would be required to do the programming. Id at 1406-07, 4 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) at 992-94. These cases provide a key to the disclosure standards
that will be imposed to limit program patentability and, perhaps more impor-
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ton the apparatus claims were allowed, based on the fact that a pro-
gram that would alter a specific computer was disclosed, even though
neither contained a specification of the structure of the computer used.
In 1974, the CCPA decided In re Johnston363 and provided grist
for the Supreme Court's next opportunity to discuss the patentability of
computer programming. The appellants in Johnston sought method
and apparatus patents on an automatic financial record-keeping system
that employed a digital computer.3" The general control directing the
invention was a software computer program, intended for use in a gen-
eral purpose digital computer and providing bank customers with a
categorized breakdown of their transactions. The Patent Office Board
of Appeals rejected all of the claims as nonstatutory subject matter,
based on its view that the invention extended beyond the field of the
technological arts.365 In other words, the Board felt that granting this
patent would create a monopoly on a method of conducting banking
business and would be an intrusion by the patent system into the social
sciences. All the claims were further rejected under section 103 as being
"obvious" variations of systems of bookkeeping used by banks and
other industries.
366
The CCPA reversed the Board's rejection of the four apparatus
claims appealed, holding that "[r]ecord-keeping machine systems are
clearly within the 'technological arts.' "367 The court stated that it was
unaware of "any dictionary that would define a machine system as
within the purview of the 'liberal arts.' "368 Unlike Benson, the court
noted that "the instant claims, in apparatus form, [did] not claim or
encompass a law of nature, a mathematical formula, or an al-
gorithm. ' 369 The CCPA indicated that the technological arts doctrine
had survived Benson, which had merely considered the issue of
whether "'a formula for converting binary coded decimal numerals
into pure binary numbers by a series of mathematical calculations was
a patentable process.' "370 By thus narrowing the Benson holding, the
tantly, they indicate that programs will be patentable when they are sufficiently
disclosed as parts of method and apparatus claims. At a minimum, "a program
listing is required to avoid rejection for non-disclosure." Note, Protection of Com-
puter Software -A HardProblem, 26 DRAKE L. REv. 180, 189 (1976-1977). Nev-
ertheless, even if a program method fails under the Benson- like "mental process"
test, it may still be potentially patentable as part of an apparatus claim. See In re
Gunn, 537 F.2d 1123, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 248 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
363. 502 F.2d 765, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd
sub nom Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan)
1133 (1976).
364. Id at 768, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1497.
365. Id at 769, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1498.
366. Id at 769-70, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1499.
367. Id at 771, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1501 (emphasis in original).
368. Id (emphasis in original).
369. Id at 771, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1502 (emphasis in original).
370. Id. (quoting In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 4 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Calla-
ghan) 66 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
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CCPA created a basis for eroding the effect of the Benson decision and
for distinguishing it out of existence.
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not disturb the CCPA's rea-
soning on the section 101 issue when it reviewed Johnston.37'
Nevertheless, the Court reversed the CCPA's decision based on a find-
ing of obviousness.3 72 The Court was guided by the factors it had set
forth in Graham v. John Deere Co. 373 In Graham, the Court had held
that the central factors relevant to any inquiry into obviousness are
"the scope and content of the prior art," the "differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue" and the "level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art."' 374 Application of these factors in Johnston led the Court
to conclude, "The gap between the prior art and respondent's system is
simply not so great as to render the system non-obvious to one reason-
ably skilled in the art. '3 75 The Court noted that, while it had said in
Graham that "'secondary considerations [such] as commercial success,
long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others' "might be relevant
in determining obviousness, 376 none of those considerations offered
substantial support for the claims of nonobviousness.377
After having another of its decisions on a software patent struck
down in Johnston, the CCPA decided In re Chaoeld378 and In re
NoP3 79 and, through narrow interpretation of Benson, indicated its in-
tention to continue favoring patent protection for software. Noll's in-
vention was an apparatus for displaying text supplied by a computer or
similar source on a cathode ray tube3 ° The hardware used was not
novel but was under control of a novel program which transformed the
digital computer into a system for scan-converting data. The invention
was distinguished from the prior art, a hardwired circuitry apparatus
enabling the same kind of graphic display through scan conversion, in
that it operated under the control of a program with its attendant flex-
ibility.381' The Board rejected several of Noll's claims, based on inade-
quate disclosure and nonstatutory subject matter,382 stating:
371. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1133,
1134 (1976).
372. Id at 230, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1142.
373. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
374. Id at 17.
375. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 1133,
1142 (1976).
376. Id at 230 n.4, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 1141 n.4 (quoting Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)).
377. Id
378. 545 F.2d 152, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 52 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
379. 545 F.2d 141, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 69 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
380. Id at 142, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 69.
381. Id at 144, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 71-72.
382. Id at 145-47, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 74-78.
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To allow an applicant to secure patent protection by appara-
tus claims to subject matter, the only disclosure for which is
an equivalent computer program, after the decision in the
Benson et al. case would be, in our opinion, to allow him to
do by indirection what the Supreme Court has indicated he
should not be allowed to do directly, e.g., obtain protection of
the computer program as such. 83
The CCPA reversed the section 101 rejection, finding that, however
broadly Benson might be interpreted, it was limited to "method claims
such as those presented in that case. ' '384 Noll's was an apparatus claim,
drawn to a physical structure, not to an algorithm or abstract law, and
was limited to a particular technology. The CCPA also reversed the
section 112 rejection holding that, once the applicant had described the
"means" of his claim, the specified general purpose computer and
equivalents thereof, he need not describe the full range of equivalents
of his invention.
3 85
Thus, in what seems to have been its determination to allow pat-
ents for programs, the CCPA distinguished Noll from Benson by noting
that no method claim was involved in Noll However, in Chaofeld, de-
cided concurrently, the applicant had appealed from the Patent Office's
rejection of his claims for a method of operating a multiprogrammed
computer system.3 86 The Board found that the claims read on nonstat-
utory subject matter because, like the claims in Benson, they included a
mathematical formulation and an algorithm for solving it and because
the "end use" claims were unlimited.38 " Although the CCPA found
that no "processing program" was claimed in Chayfeld, it took the op-
portunity to note that nothing in prior judicial opinions precluded pat-
ent protection for computer programs; Benson's claims were rejected
because they pre-empted all use of the underlying mathematical
formula and the involved algorithm.
3 8 8
The court further held that the operating method at issue in Chat-
field should be treated no differently from any other machine system.38 9
It went on to uphold its ruling in Bernhart that a claim as a whole does
not become nonstatutory merely because the point of patentability was
383. Id at 147, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 78.
384. Id at 149, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 81 (emphasis added). The
dissent noted the "differing, conflicting interpretations with respect to whether
[Benson] represents a general proscription on the patenting of computer programs
under section 101" and concluded that it did represent such a proscription, argu-
ing that the proscription applied even if the claims were drafted in apparatus
form. Id at 151, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 85 (Lane, J.,
dissenting).
385. Id at 149-50, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 81-83.
386. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 153, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 52, 53
(C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
387. Id at 155, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 56.
388. Id at 155-56, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 57.
389. Id at 157, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 60.
19821
nonstatutory, ie., the novel claims lay in an equation.39 ° In this con-
text, the court distinguished Christensen, in which the invention merely
gathered the data to solve an equation. 9' In Chaofeld, the process did
not end with the solution of a particular equation. Although mathe-
matical algorithms appeared in the dependent claims, they were only
used to carry out the independent claims or analysis steps. The only
employment of the algorithms that would be pre-empted would be
their use in the performance of the entire claimed method.3 92 More-
over, the claims were limited to the operation of a computing machine
system as specified.
Six months after Chao'feld and Nol, the CCPA decided In re
Deutsch. 393 The issue in that case was whether the method claimed
read on nonstatutory subject matter, and again the CCPA reversed the
PTO's refusal to grant a patent. The invention was a method to control
and optimize the operation of a system of multi-unit manufacturing
plants.3 94 The Board found the point of novelty in the invention to be a
formula or algorithm employed in the system and, following Benson,
rejected the claims.3 95 The CCPA held, however, that it was error to
focus on the control means or optimization computing technique used
by Deutsch because the whole invention lay in the "timing and se-
quencing of control application. ' ' 396 The disclosed computing tech-
nique and processing programs were alternative means to implement
the optimization task. Thus, the processing programs were held to be
even more incidental to the invention than those in Chaofeld 397 Even
when used, the program algorithms of the Deutsch system would be
freely available for any other purpose and thus not pre-empted. Fur-
thermore, the court held that the invention was "in the technologically
useful art of controlling and optimizing a system of manufacturing
plants to a particular end use" and, therefore, constituted a statutory
process.398
The Deutsch decision did not mean that the CCPA was reinstitut-
ing the technological arts doctrine as the decisive factor in its decisions.
This became readily apparent when the court decided In re Waldbaum
390. Id at 157-58, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 60-62. The CCPA upheld
the patentability of the invention in Chafeld by a three to two vote. The dissent-
ers argued, however, that the end use of Chatfield's invention was no more un-
limited than the end use labeled "too broad" in Benson, in that both were methods
carried out in data processing equipment. Id. at 161, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) at 66-67 (Rich,. J., dissenting).
391. id at 158, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 62-63.
392. Id at 158-59, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 62-63.
393. 553 F.2d 689, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 408 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
394. Id at 690, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 409.
395. Id at 691-92, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 411-12.
396. Id at 692, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 413.
397. Id
398. Id at 693, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 415.
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j 399 successor to In re Waldbaum I, I the holding of which the Pat-
ent Office had moved to vacate following the Supreme Court's decision
in Benson. 4' In Waldbaum I, the CCPA had found that a method for
controlling a data processor to calculate the relative number of O's (ze-
ros) and l's (ones) in a date word constituted statutory subject matter
40 2
basing its holding on the theory that the method was in the technologi-
cal arts.1 3 Relying on Benson, the Patent Office Board of Appeals be-
lieved that the technological arts doctrine was insufficient to sustain
patenting an invention that involved a procedure for solving a problem
mathematical in nature.' In its first invalidation of a software inven-
tion since Christensen, the CCPA agreed that the decision in Waldbaum
I should be vacated. The court stated that, as in Benson, the claims
were "so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown
uses," and the algorithm involved would be pre-empted if a monopoly
were granted on its described use in the operation of data processing
apparatus. 40 5 The court grouped Waldbaum with Christensen, arguing
that the inventions in both cases were directed to a calculation of an
algorithm; they were unlike Deutsch and Chaofteld, in which the inven-
tions were methods of operating a system or machines by employing
algorithms.'
A week after Wadbaum II, the CCPA decided In re Fook.407
The Flook invention involved a method for updating alarm limits of
hydrocarbon conversions, "accomplished by some type of computer in
accordance with a mathematical control equation." 8 Specifically, the
process involved "an initial step which reads the parameters of the
chemical process system, an intermediate step which uses an algorithm
... ,and a final step in which the actual alarm value is adjusted."'
The Board rejected the claim because its only non-conventional feature
was the algorithm, constituting nonstatutory subject matter.410 The
399. 559 F.2d 611, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
400. 457 F.2d 997, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 173 (C.C.P.A. 1972), vacated,
559 F.2d 611, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
401. In re Waldbaum II, 559 F.2d 611, 615, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan)
415, 421 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
402. 457 F.2d 997, 1003, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 173, 181-82 (C.C.P.A.
1972), vacated, 559 F.2d 611, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 415 (C.C.P.A.
1977).
403. In re Waldbaum II, 559 F.2d 611, 615, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 415,
421 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
404. Id
405. Id at 616, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 423 (quoting Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64-68, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 256, 256-59
(1972)).
406. Id at 617, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 425.
407. 559 F.2d 21, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 426 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'dsub
nomz Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 833
(1978).
408. Id at 22, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 427.
409. Id
410. Id at 22, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 428.
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CCPA reversed, holding "a claim to a process which uses an algorithm
to modify a conventional manufacturing system is statutory subject
matter,"'41 I distinguishing the Christensen invention, which did nothing
else after solving the algorithm.
Christensen recognized that the absence of a step other than
those steps required for solution of the algorithm necessarily
precludes the possibility that the claim involves statutory sub-
ject matter. . . . [A] claim must include a recitation which
materially limits the claim to a scope less than the mere act of
solving an algorithm. . . . [T]his requirement . ..may be
satisfied by the recitation of some sort of post-solution
activity.41 2
In Flook, the claims included, as a recitation of post-solution activity,
"a step in which the solution is applied to a control system. 413 Mere
solution of the algorithm would not infringe upon Flook's claim; there-
fore, it was allowed.
The Supreme Court took its third excursion into the debate over
software patentability when it reversed the CCPA's decision in
Flook. 414 The Court noted that it had held in Benson that a mathemat-
ical formula may not be patented; in Fook, the question was "whether
the identification of a limited category of useful, though conventional,
post-solution applications of such a formula makes respondent's
method eligible for patent protection. 4 15 The Court explained that
Flook's claim offered no new methods of selecting the variables that
had to be plugged into the algorithm involved.
Responding to the CCPA's insistence that a patent claim must be
considered as a whole, the Court agreed that the proper test was
whether the process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, was
new and useful.416 Even so, the Court held:
Respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101 not because
it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but
because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior
art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no pat-
entable invention. Even though a phenomenon of nature or
mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive ap-
plication of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the
discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent un-
less there is some other inventive concept in its application.1 7
411. Id at 22-23, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 429 (emphasis in original).
412. Id at 23, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 429 (emphasis in original).
413. Id
414. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 833 (1978).
415. Id at 585, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 834.
416. Id at 591, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 840 (citing Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Mackay Radio & Tele. Co. v. Radio
Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1938)).
417. Id at 594, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 842. The Court was actually
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The fact that the method claim would not pre-empt every conceivable
application of the formula was deemed insufficient, by itself, to support
patentability.4"8 The Court ended its opinion by observing that if pat-
ent protection for programs was desirable as a matter of policy and to
promote the useful arts, Congress should take the lead.41 9
The CCPA's next opportunity to consider program patentability
came in In re Freeman. 420 Freeman's invention was a "system for type-
setting alpha-numeric information, using a computer-based control sys-
tem in conjunction with a phototypesetter of conventional design.
421
Its advantage over the prior art came in its positioning of mathematical
symbols in an expression.
The Board rejected the claims stating that their novelty resided
only in the program, which involved use of an algorithm and which, if
patented, would pre-empt the algorithm itself.422 It further noted that
the invention had no practical application except in connection with a
digital computer. The CCPA resorted to its usual practice of dist-
inguishing Benson and reversed the Board. According to the court, the
claims in Freeman did not recite an algorithm in the Benson sense:
"Because every process may be characterized as a 'step-by-step proce-
dure. . . for accomplishing some end,' a refusal to recognize that Ben-
son was concerned only with mathematical algorithms leads to the
absurd view that the Court was reading the word 'process' out of the
statute. 423 While mathematical algorithms may be expressed in many
ways, such as in traditional mathematical symbols or in prose, Free-
man's method claims did not recite steps that were calculations, formu-
las or equations. Thus, Benson should not have been called into
play.4
24
assisted in overturning the CCPA decision by the CCPA's own words in In re
Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 802 (C.C.P.A.
1977). In that case the CCPA had explained: "[If a claim is directed essentially
to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula, even if the solution isfor
a speelcpurpose, the claimed method is nonstatutory." Id at 1030, 6 Computer
L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 807 (emphasis added). See also In re Castelet, 562
F.2d 1236, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 787 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
418. 437 U.S. 584, 585, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 833, 835 (1978).
419. Id at 595-96, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 843.
420. 573 F.2d 1237, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 809 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
421. Id at 1238, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 809-10.
422. Id at 1242-43, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 816.
423. Id at 1245-46, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 821 (emphasis in
original).
424. Id at 1246-47, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 822. In Freeman, the
CCPA arrived at a two-step analysis for determining whether a claim pre-empts
an algorithm and is therefore unpatentable. The court stated that the first inquiry
is whether "the claim directly or indirectly recites an 'algorithm' in the Benson
sense of that term." Id at 1245, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 820. If
the answer to that inquiry is yes, then the court stated that the second step would
be "further [analysis] to ascertain whether in its entirety [the claim] wholly
preempts that algorithm." Id If it does, then the algorithm is unpatentable. Id
Several subsequent cases have applied this two-tier Freeman test to determine
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Not quite two months after its Freeman decision, the CCPA
decided In re Toma. 425 Again, the CCPA reversed the Board's rejec-
tion of all the claims.426 The invention was "a method of operating a
digital computer to translate from a source natural language, e.g., Rus-
sian, to a target natural language, e.g., English." '427 The court relied on
its reasoning in Freeman that unless claims directly or indirectly recite
a Benson- type algorithm (a procedure for solving a given type of math-
ematical problem), they are not rendered nonstatutory by Benson. 4 28
The recited steps in Toma for translating between natural languages
were not mere procedures for solving mathematical problems; thus, it
was of no consequence that the algorithm involved was the only differ-
ence between the claimed method and the prior art computer transla-
tion method. Furthermore, translation by a computer clearly falls
within the technological rather than the liberal arts. The "useful" arts
inquiry must focus on "whether the claimed subject matter (a method
of operating a machine to translate) is statutory, . . . not on whether
the prior art which the claimed subject matter purports to replace
(translation by human mind) is statutory." '429
The most recent Supreme Court decision addressing the patenta-
bility of computer software is Diamond v. Diehr. 43 0 The Diehr inven-
tion involved a "process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber
into cured precision products."43' Diehr's invention would constantly
measure the temperature inside the mold that formed the rubber prod-
ucts, and by feeding the temperature measurements into a computer
that repeatedly recalculated the cure time by use of a mathematical
formula, would signal a device to open the press at the proper time.432
The Patent Office rejected Diehr's claims on the ground that, based
upon Benson, they were drawn on nonstatutory subject matter.433 The
CCPA reversed, finding that an otherwise statutory claim is not ren-
dered nonstatutory because a computer is involved.434 The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding Diehr's process claim to be an industrial pro-
whether a claimed process was an algorithm and, if so, whether the claim wholly
pre-empted the algorithm. Eg., In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 7 Computer L.
Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 675 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); In
re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 591 (C.C.P.A.
1979), aj'd per curiam, 450 U.S. 381 (1981); In re Philipp, 608 F.2d 879, 7 Com-
puter L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 614 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Johnson, 589 F.2d
1070, 7 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 541 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
425. 575 F.2d 872, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 824 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
426. Id at 873-74, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 825.
427. Id at 874, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 825.
428. Id. at 877, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 832.
429. Id at 877-78, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 832.
430. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
431. Id at 177.
432. Id at 178-79.
433. Id at 179-80.
434. Id at 181 (citing In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979)). The CCPA noted
that Diehr's claims were directed neither to a mathematical algorithm nor to an
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cess of the type that had been historically given patent protection. 35
The Court noted that Diehr's claim was not an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula, prohibited by Benson, but was rather a process
claim that implemented a mathematical formula and digital computer
to achieve the desired result.436 In conclusion, the Court stated that a
process claim utilizing a mathematical formula and digital computer
would not be rendered nonstatutory unless the claim were an attempt
to patent the algorithm itself.
437
3. Analysis
It is obvious from the above decisions that whether software in a
particular case is patentable may depend upon the forum in which a
final determination is made. Repeatedly reversed by the CCPA, the
PTO appears nonetheless determined to abide by its broad interpreta-
tion of Benson and to look unfavorably upon patent applications for
computer programs. A major objection is probably that accepting pro-
gram patent applications might impose a severe burden on the Office's
operations.43 s Because the PTO must compete with the private sector
for the limited number of skilled employees, the office is likely to have
insufficient personnel with the required expertise to determine whether
software claims actually constitute novel, nonobvious departures from
prior art. Additionally, the Patent Office lacks both an examination
procedure and a file or system of classification of prior art from which
to search and investigate new applications. In contrast, the CCPA
seems firmly rooted in the belief that Benson is to be narrowly inter-
preted. Yet, even so, it will affirm PTO rejections in cases in which it is
clear that the recitation of a Benson- type algorithm is the essence of the
claim. Somewhere in between, the Supreme Court may be expected to
continue its cautious approach to software patentability, favoring con-
gressional initiative on the subject. The Diamond v. Diehr 43 decision,
however, shows at least the beginning of action on the Court's part to
keep faith with its earlier statements in dicta that computer software is
not inherently unpatentable.
Despite the disagreement, some general observations can be made.
It probably will be irrelevant whether software claims are drafted as
apparatus or method claims because the PTO and CCPA appear un-
willing to allow an applicant to accomplish indirectly what he could
improved method of calculation, but to a process for molding rubber articles by
solving a practical problem that had arisen in the industry. Id
435. Id at 184.
436. Id at 187.
437. Id at 191-93. The Court found that Diehr's claim was not an attempt to patent
the algorithm involved, but only to patent the industrial process; therefore, the
Court allowed the claim. Id.
438. See In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 159, 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 52,
68 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Rich, J., dissenting).
439. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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not claim directly. Nevertheless, method claims should be tied to at
least one appropriate device or structure, such as a general purpose dig-
ital computer. It will probably be unnecessary to describe the structure
in great detail if it is a part of the prior art or to describe the structure
as transformed by the program. However, the disclosure of a program-
ming claim should still include a program listing.
Most, if not all, process claims will recite an algorithm. If the only
novel point of a claim is its non-mathematical algorithm, it will be stat-
utory subject matter and patentable as long as it satisfies the other stat-
utory requirements, such as usefulness and nonobviousness. If,
however, the invention claim recites a Benson-type algorithm, it will
also need to specifically recite a novel and practical end use so that the
patent sought will not totally pre-empt all practical application of the
algorithm. Regardless of post-solution activity, a claim reciting a
mathematical algorithm with no other novel point will not constitute
statutory subject matter. Finally, to be patented the invention must not
be obvious, in light of prior art, to those reasonably skilled in the art of
programming.
The obviousness factor may continue to be a major stumbling
block to program patentability. Although the Supreme Court in John-
ston found no basis for applying Graham's secondary indicia of nonob-
viousness (others having attempted and failed to accomplish the same
result), it did not reject that test.' Many software inventors will prob-
ably need to rely on such circumstantial evidence.
In the context of computer programming, the use of cir-
cumstantial indicia of nonobviousness may be crucial in some
instances. When presented with the esoteric technology pres-
ent in the computer software industry, the factual distinctions
produced by the Graham analysis do not necessarily lend
themselves to a clear resolution of the nonobviousness issue.
In practice, the only way for courts to meaningfully resolve
the section 103 issue may be to place increased emphasis on
the probative value of circumstantial evidence .... 44,
440. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 226 (1976). A sign that the courts may favorably
use the Graham secondary criteria can be found in the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263, 3 Computer
L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 693 (9th Cir. 1971). The court in that case stated,
"When the evidence shows that several others in the art have attempted to solve
the same problem and have not arrived at the solution claimed by the patent in
suit, the statutory presumption of validity is substantially strengthened." Id at
272, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 706. Noting earlier industry at-
tempts and failures, the court held that the plaintiff's patented method for check-
ing an analog computer was not obvious in light of the prior art. Id at 272, 3
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) at 707-08.
441. Comment, Patentability of Computer Software.- The Nonobiousness Issue, 62 IowA
L. REv. 615, 630 (1976). The writer notes further that reliance on the Graham
criteria may be the "best way to achieve a rational disposition of the unique legal
problems presented by the highly sophisticated computer industry and at the same
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If it were recognized that the purpose of the patent system is the
promotion of the "useful arts," it would be clear that the question of
whether a process is statutory should be determined largely in light of
its actual contribution to technological progress. In other words, inven-
tions that in fact promote the useful arts should not be discriminated
against by court-created barriers to patentability. This type of discrimi-
nation would be eliminated by a pure application of the "technological
arts" doctrine, unaffected by the fact that a claimed process might con-
tain mental steps. The "technological arts" doctrine clearly encom-
passes computer programs because a program is a process that is useful
in the internal operation of a computer and, as such, within the useful
or technological arts.
Resolution of the question of software patentability is not likely to
come until congressional action is taken. If Congress does act, it is
likely to at least consider proposals that an alternative form of protec-
tion be created for the unique and complex technology of computer
software. Congress is constitutionally authorized to promote the useful
arts by extending protection to inventors and their discoveries, but it is




The need for proprietary protection of software products is obvi-
ous from the competitive nature of the industry and the growing
number of articles and decisions published on the subject. As with any
new technological advancement, however, judicial and legislative bod-
ies are slow in adapting the law to meet the needs of software manufac-
turers. Nevertheless, on both state and federal levels, software
manufacturers are experiencing increasing. success in recovering for
misappropriation of the products they have expended exorbitant
amounts of time and money developing. Despite this encouraging fact,
proprietors should be aware of the possible impediments to legally
safeguarding their products and take independent action to prevent the
piracy of others.
time to maintain the constitutional objectives effectuated by the Patent Act." Id
at 635.
Interestingly, no question relating to obviousness was ever raised in Benson,
despite the fact that "often when a programmer may wish to convey data from
one format to the other. . . he will devise a series of instructions which are the
logical equivalent of the set which Benson tried to patent." See Note, Computer
Software: Beyond the Limits of Existing Proprietary Protection Policy, 40 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 116, 135 (1973).
442. Note, Computer Sofjware: Beyond the Limits of Existing Proprietary Protection
Policy, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 116, 143 (1973). "There is nothing sacred about
the dual American scheme of proprietary protection as it exists today." Id
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